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Abstract
Problem/Condition: Since 1971, CDC, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Council of State
and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) have maintained a collaborative surveillance system for the occurrences and
causes of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs).This surveillance system is the primary source of data concerning
the scope and effects of waterborne diseases on persons in the United States.
Reporting Period Covered: This summary includes data regarding outbreaks occurring during January 1999–December
2000 and previously unreported outbreaks occurring in 1995 and 1997.
Description of the System: The surveillance system includes data for outbreaks associated with drinking water and
recreational water. State, territorial, and local public health departments are primarily responsible for detecting and
investigating WBDOs and voluntarily reporting them to CDC on a standard form. The unit of analysis for the WBDO
surveillance system is an outbreak, not an individual case of a waterborne disease. Two criteria must be met for an event
to be defined as a WBDO. First, >2 persons must have experienced a similar illness after either ingestion of drinking
water or exposure to water encountered in recreational or occupational settings. This criterion is waived for single cases
of laboratory-confirmed primary amebic meningoencephalitis and for single cases of chemical poisoning if water-
quality data indicate contamination by the chemical. Second, epidemiologic evidence must implicate water as the prob-
able source of the illness.
Results: During 1999–2000, a total of 39 outbreaks associated with drinking water was reported by 25 states. Included
among these 39 outbreaks was one outbreak that spanned 10 states. These 39 outbreaks caused illness among an
estimated 2,068 persons and were linked to two deaths. The microbe or chemical that caused the outbreak was identi-
fied for 22 (56.4%) of the 39 outbreaks; 20 of the 22 identified outbreaks were associated with pathogens, and two were
associated with chemical poisoning. Of the 17 outbreaks involving acute gastroenteritis of unknown etiology, one was
a suspected chemical poisoning, and the remaining 16 were suspected as having an infectious cause. Twenty-eight
(71.8%) of 39 outbreaks were linked to groundwater sources; 18 (64.3%) of these 28 groundwater outbreaks were
associated with private or noncommunity wells that were not regulated by EPA. Fifty-nine outbreaks from 23 states
were attributed to recreational water exposure and affected an estimated 2,093 persons. Thirty-six (61.0%) of the 59
were outbreaks involving gastroenteritis. The etiologic agent was identified in 30 (83.3%) of 36 outbreaks involving
gastroenteritis. Twenty-two (61.1%) of 36 gastroenteritis-related outbreaks were associated with pools or interactive
fountains. Four (6.8%) of the 59 recreational water outbreaks were attributed to single cases of primary amebic menin-
goencephalitis (PAM) caused by Naegleria fowleri. All four cases were fatal. Fifteen (25.4%) of the 59 outbreaks were
associated with dermatitis; 12 (80.0%) of 15 were associated with hot tubs or pools. In addition, recreational water
outbreaks of leptospirosis, Pontiac fever, and chemical keratitis, as well as two outbreaks of leptospirosis and Pontiac
fever associated with occupational exposure were also reported to CDC.
Interpretation: The proportion of drinking water outbreaks associated with surface water increased from 11.8%
during 1997–1998 to 17.9% in 1999–2000. The proportion of outbreaks (28) associated with groundwater sources
increased 87% from the previous reporting period (15 outbreaks), and these outbreaks were primarily associated (60.7%)
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with consumption of untreated groundwater. Recreational water outbreaks involving gastroenteritis doubled (36 out-
breaks) from the number of outbreaks reported in the previous reporting period (18 outbreaks). These outbreaks were
most frequently associated with Cryptosporidium parvum (68.2%) in treated water venues (e.g., swimming pools or
interactive fountains) and by Escherichia coli O157:H7 (21.4%) in freshwater venues. The increase in the number of
outbreaks probably reflects improved surveillance and reporting at the local and state level as well as a true increase in
the number of WBDOs.
Public Health Action: CDC and others have used surveillance data to identify the types of water systems, their
deficiencies, and the etiologic agents associated with outbreaks and evaluated current technologies for providing safe
drinking water and safe recreational water. Surveillance data are used also to establish research priorities, which can lead
to improved water-quality regulations. Only the groundwater systems under the influence of surface water are required
to disinfect their water supplies, but EPA is developing a groundwater rule that specifies when corrective action (includ-
ing disinfection) is required. CDC and EPA are conducting epidemiologic studies to assess the level of waterborne
illness attributable to municipal drinking water in nonoutbreak conditions. Rules under development by EPA — the
Ground Water Rule (GWR), the Long Term 2 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule (LT2ESWTR), and Stage 2
Disinfection Byproduct Rules (DBPR) — are expected to further protect the public from contaminants and disinfec-
tion byproducts in drinking water. Efforts by EPA under the Beaches Environmental Assessment, Closure, and Health
(BEACH) program are aimed at reducing the risks for infection attributed to ambient recreational water by strengthen-
ing beach standards and testing; providing faster laboratory test methods; predicting pollution; investing in health and
methods research; and improving public access to information regarding both the quality of the water at beaches and
information concerning health risks associated with swimming in polluted water. EPA’s Beach Watch (available at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/beaches) provides online information regarding water quality at U.S. beaches, local
protection programs, and other beach-related programs. CDC partnered with a consortium of local and national pool
associations to develop a series of health communication materials for the general public who attend treated recre-
ational water venues and to staff who work at those venues. CDC has also developed a recreational water outbreak
investigation toolkit that can be used by public health professionals. All of the CDC materials are accessible at the CDC
Healthy Swimming website (http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming).
Introduction
During 1920–1970, statistical data regarding U.S. waterborne-
disease outbreaks (WBDOs) were collected by multiple
researchers and federal agencies (1). Since 1971, CDC, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Coun-
cil of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) have main-
tained a collaborative surveillance system that tracks the
occurrences and causes of WBDOs (2–6). This surveillance
system includes data regarding outbreaks associated with
drinking water, recreational water, and other types of water
exposures. This report includes data for 1999 and 2000 and
for previously unreported drinking water-associated outbreaks
that occurred in 1995 and 1997.
CDC’s and EPA’s surveillance activities are intended to
1) characterize the epidemiology of WBDOs; 2) identify the
etiologic agents that caused WBDOs and determine why the
outbreaks occurred; 3) train public health personnel to detect
and investigate WBDOs; and 4) collaborate with local, state,
federal, and international agencies on initiatives to prevent
waterborne disease. Data obtained through this surveillance
system are useful for identifying major deficiencies in provid-
ing safe drinking water and recreational water. Surveillance
information can influence research priorities, lead to improved
water-quality regulations, and illustrate the burden of illness
attributed to water.
Background
EPA Regulations
Drinking Water
Public water systems are regulated under the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA) of 1974 and its subsequent 1986 and
1996 amendments (7–9) (Box). Under SDWA, EPA is
authorized to set national standards to protect drinking water
and its sources against naturally occurring or man-made con-
taminants. The 1996 SDWA amendments require EPA to
publish a list every 5 years of contaminants that are known or
anticipated to occur in public water systems and that might
need to be regulated. The first list was called the drinking
water Contaminant Candidate List (CCL). CCL contained
60 contaminants/contaminant groups, included 10 pathogens,
and was published in the Federal Register on March 2, 1998
(10). A decision concerning whether to regulate >5 contami-
nants from CCL was required by August 2001. Microbial
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Safe Drinking Water Act/1974 and
1986 and 1996 amendments
Total Coliform Rule (TCR)/and
Maximum Contaminant Level
(MCL)/1989
Surface Water Treatment Rule
(SWTR)/1989
Information Collection Rule/
1996–1998
Interim Enhanced Surface Water
Treatment Rule (IESWTR)/1998
BOX. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations regarding drinking water, 1974–2003
Regulation/date Description
Authorizes EPA to set national standards to protect drinking water and its sources
Requires routine monitoring for total coliforms of all public water systems plus periodic
on-site inspections for systems that take <5 samples/month to evaluate and document treat-
ment, storage, distribution network, operation and maintenance, and overall management.
Systems that collect >40 samples/month (i.e., typically, systems that serve >33,000 persons)
violate MCL if >5.0% of the samples collected during each month are positive for total coliforms;
systems that collect <40 samples/month violate MCL if two samples during the month are
positive for total coliforms. If a system has a total coliform-positive sample, then 1) that sample
must be tested for the presence of fecal coliforms or Escherichia coli, and 2) three repeat samples
must be collected (four, if the system collects <1 routine sample/month) within 24 hours and
analyzed for total coliforms. If positive, the sample must be analyzed for fecal coliforms or
Es. coli. In addition, >5 routine samples must be collected during the next month of sampling,
regardless of system size. For any size system, if two consecutive total coliform-positive samples
occur at one site during a month, and one of these samples is also fecal coliform-positive or
Es. coli-positive, the system has an acute violation of the Maximum Contaminant Level and
must notify the state and the public immediately.
Covers all water systems that use surface water or groundwater under the direct influence of
surface water; all systems must disinfect their water, and the majority of systems must filter
their water also, unless they meet EPA-specified filter-avoidance criteria that define high-
quality source water. Specific requirements include
• a combined filter-effluent–performance standard for turbidity (i.e., for rapid granular
filters, 0.5 nephelometric turbidity unit [NTU] maximum for 95% of measurements [taken
every 4 hours] during a month) and no single NTU reading >5.0;
• watershed protection, redundant disinfection capability, and other requirements for
unfiltered systems;
• a 0.2-mg/L disinfectant residual entering the distribution system; and
• maintenance of a detectable disinfectant residual in all parts of the distribution
system.
This rule requires that all such systems reduce the level of Giardia by 99.9% (3-log reduction)
and viruses by 99.99% (4-log reduction) through a combination of removal (filtration) and
inactivation (disinfection).
Requires systems serving >100,000 persons to provide treatment data and monitor disinfec-
tion byproducts and source water quality parameters. Surface water systems are also required
to monitor Cryptosporidium, Giardia, total culturable viruses, and total and fecal coliforms or
Es. coli >1 time/month for 18 months. Results provided information to facilitate development
of the Long Term 2 Enhanced SWTR, which is intended to protect against microbial risks by
targeting those systems with suboptimal quality source water and to balance the health risks
associated with disinfection byproducts and the anticipated Stage 2 Disinfection Byproduct Rule.
Follow-up to SWTR that covers all public systems using surface water or groundwater under
the direct influence of surface water and serving >10,000 persons. Key provisions include
• a 2-log Cryptosporidium-removal requirement for filtered systems;
• strengthened combined filter-effluent–turbidity performance standards for systems using
conventional filtration treatment or direct filtration (0.3 NTU maximum for 95% of
measurements during a month and no single NTU reading >1.0);
• individual filter turbidity monitoring provisions;
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Lead and Copper Rule/2000
changes
Long Term 1 Enhanced SWTR
(LT1ESWTR)/2002 and the Filter
Backwash Recycling Rule (FBRR)/
2001
Long Term 2 Enhanced SWTR
(LT2ESWTR)/expected in 2003
Stage 2 Disinfection Byproduct
Rule (DBPR)/expected in 2003
Ground Water Rule (GWR) (1996
amendment to EPA’s Safe Drink-
ing Water Act)/expected to be
finalized in 2003
• disinfection profile and benchmark provisions to ensure continued levels of microbial protec-
tion while facilities take necessary steps to comply with new disinfection byproduct standards;
• revision of the definition of groundwater under the influence of surface water and the
watershed-control requirements for unfiltered public water systems to include detection
of Cryptosporidium;
• requirements for covers on newly finished water reservoirs;
• sanitary surveys for all surface water systems regardless of size; and
• an MCL goal of zero oocysts for Cryptosporidium.
Streamlines requirements, promotes consistent national implementation, and reduces the
burden for water systems.
Companion regulations for IESWTR; LT1ESWTR applies to public water systems that use
surface water or groundwater under the direct influence of surface water and that serve <10,000
persons. FBRR regulates how treatment plants recycle water that has been used to backwash a
filter or that has been extracted from treatment plant sludge. FBRR regulates the point in the
treatment plant at which the contaminated recycle water may be introduced, assuring that the
water is subject to the entire particle and Cryptosporidium parvum removal process.
Applies to all systems using surface water or groundwater under the influence of surface water;
will provide additional protection against Cryptosporidium. Systems will be assigned to a treat-
ment category on the basis of their source-water Cryptosporidium levels; the category then
determines how much additional treatment is required.
Will apply to community water systems and nontransient noncommunity water systems that
use an alternative to ultraviolet disinfection or deliver disinfected water; systems will be
required to monitor for total trihalomethanes and the sum of five haloacetic acids and comply
with MCLs at each monitoring location as a locational running annual average.
Applies to public groundwater systems (i.e., systems that have >15 service connections, or
regularly serve >25 persons daily for >60 days/year) or any system that mixes surface and
groundwater if the groundwater is added directly to the distribution system and provided to
consumers without treatment. Establishes multiple barriers to protect against bacteria and
viruses in drinking water from groundwater sources; establishes targeted strategy to identify
groundwater systems at high risk for fecal contamination. Key areas include
• system sanitary surveys;
• hydrogeologic sensitivity assessments for nondisinfected systems;
• source-water microbial monitoring by systems that do not disinfect and that draw from
hydrogeologically sensitive aquifers or have detected fecal indicators within the system’s
distribution system;
• corrective action by any system with substantial deficiencies or positive microbial samples
indicating fecal contamination; and
• compliance monitoring for systems that disinfect to ensure that they reliably achieve 4-log
(99.99%) inactivation or removal of viruses.
GWR does not apply to privately owned wells that serve <25 persons (e.g., individual home-
owner wells).
BOX (Continued). Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations regarding drinking water, 1974–2003
Regulation/date Description
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contamination is regulated under the Total Coliform Rule
(TCR) of 1989 and the Surface Water Treatment Rule
(SWTR) of 1989 (11–13). SWTR covers all water systems
that use surface water or groundwater under the direct influ-
ence of surface water (Glossary). SWTR is intended to pro-
tect against exposure to Giardia intestinalis, viruses, and
Legionella, as well as selected other pathogens. In 1998, EPA
promulgated the Interim Enhanced Surface Water Treatment
Rule (IESWTR) (14), which provides additional protection
against Cryptosporidium and other waterborne pathogens for
systems that serve >10,000 persons. In 2002, EPA finalized
the Long Term 1 Enhanced SWTR (LT1ESWTR) for public
water systems that use surface water or groundwater under
the direct influence of surface water and serve <10,000 per-
sons (15). LT1ESWTR was proposed in combination with
the Filter Backwash Recycling Rule (FBRR), which was final-
ized in 2001 (16,17).
The 1996 Amendments require EPA to develop regulations
that require disinfection of groundwater systems as necessary
to protect the public health; EPA has proposed the Ground
Water Rule (GWR) to meet this mandate (18). GWR speci-
fies the appropriate use of disinfection in groundwater and
addresses other components of groundwater systems to
ensure public health protection. GWR applies to public
groundwater systems (systems that have >15 service connec-
tions or regularly serve >25 persons/day for >60 days/year).
This rule also applies to any system that mixes surface and
groundwater if the groundwater is added directly to the dis-
tribution system and provided to consumers without treat-
ment. GWR does not apply to privately owned wells.
Additional protection of groundwater from both chemical and
microbial contamination from shallow wells (including cess-
pools) is expected to be provided as a result of recent revisions
to the Underground Injection Control Regulations, published
December 7, 1999 (19).
To fill gaps in existing data regarding occurrence of micro-
bial pathogens and other indicators of microbial contamina-
tion, occurrence of disinfection byproducts, and
characterization of treatment processes, EPA promulgated the
Information Collection Rule in 1996 (20), which required
systems serving >100,000 persons to provide treatment data
and monitor disinfection byproducts and source-water–quality
parameters. Surface water systems are also required to moni-
tor for the presence of Cryptosporidium, Giardia, total
culturable viruses, and total* (Glossary) and fecal coliforms
or Escherichia coli >1 time/month for 18 months. The required
monitoring ended in December 1998, and data were ana-
lyzed.
EPA also made minor changes in 2000 to the Lead and
Copper Rule to streamline requirements, promote consistent
national implementation, and in certain cases, reduce the
burden for water systems. The action levels of 0.015 mg/L for
lead and 1.3 mg/L for copper remain the same (21).
Recreational Water
Regulation of recreational water is determined by state and
local governments. Standards for operating, disinfecting, and
filtering public swimming and wading pools are regulated by
state and local health departments and, as a result, are varied.
In 1986, EPA established a guideline for microbiological
water quality for recreational freshwater (e.g., lakes and ponds)
and marine water (22). The guideline recommends that the
monthly geometric mean concentration of organisms in fresh-
water should be <33/100 mL for enterococci or <126/100
mL for Es. coli. States have latitude regarding their guidelines
or regulations and can post warning signs to alert potential
bathers until water quality improves. Unlike treated venues
where disinfection can be used to address problems with
microbiological quality of the water, contaminated freshwa-
ter can require weeks or months to improve or return to nor-
mal. Prompt identification of potential sources of
contamination and remedial action is necessary to return bath-
ing water to an appropriate quality for recreational use (23).
EPA’s Action Plan for Beaches and Recreational Waters
(Beach Watch) was developed as part of the Clean Water
Action Plan.† The intent of Beach Watch is to assist state,
tribal, and local authorities in strengthening and extending
programs that specifically protect users of recreational
waters. As part of the Beaches Act of 2000, the U.S. Congress
directed EPA to also develop a new set of guidelines for recre-
ational water based on new water-quality indicators. Begin-
ning in 2003, EPA will be conducting a series of epidemiologic
studies at recreational fresh and marine beaches in the United
States. These studies will be used to develop guidelines for
using the new water-quality indicators to be included in new
EPA guidelines.
Data collected as part of the national WBDO surveillance
system are used to describe the epidemiology of waterborne
diseases in the United States. Data regarding water systems
and deficiencies implicated in these outbreaks are used to
assess whether regulations for water treatment and monitor-
ing of water quality are adequate to protect the public against
disease. Surveillance also enables identifying etiologic agents
and environmental or behavioral risk factors that are* Total coliforms are considered indicator organisms that typically do not
cause disease but might be associated with the presence of other disease-
causing organisms. Additional information regarding total coliforms is
available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/dwa/electronic/tcr.pdf. †  Additional information is available at http://www.cleanwater.gov.
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responsible for these outbreaks. This information is used to
inform public health and regulatory agencies, water utilities,
pool operators, and other stakeholders of new or reemerging
trends that might necessitate different interventions and
changes in policies and resource allotment.
Methods
Data Sources
State, territorial, and local public health agencies have pri-
mary responsibility for detecting and investigating WBDOs,
and they voluntarily report them to CDC on a standard form
(CDC form 52.12, which is available at http://www.cdc.gov/
healthyswimming). The form solicits data related to 1) char-
acteristics of the outbreak, including person, place, time, and
location of the outbreak; 2) results from epidemiological stud-
ies conducted; 3) specimen and water sample testing; and 4)
factors contributing to the outbreak, including environmen-
tal factors, water distribution, and disinfection concerns. Each
year, CDC requests reports from state and territorial epide-
miologists or from persons designated as WBDO surveillance
coordinators. Additional information regarding water qual-
ity and treatment is obtained from the state’s drinking water
agency as needed. Numerical and text data are abstracted from
the outbreak form and supporting documents and are
entered into a database before analysis.
Definitions§
The unit of analysis for the WBDO surveillance system is
an outbreak, not an individual case of a waterborne disease.
Two criteria must be met for an event to be defined as a
WBDO. First, >2 persons must have experienced a similar
illness after either ingestion of drinking water or exposure to
water encountered in recreational or occupational settings.
This criterion is waived for single cases of laboratory-
confirmed primary amebic meningoencephalitis and for single
cases of chemical poisoning if water-quality data indicate con-
tamination by the chemical. Second, epidemiologic evidence
(Table 1) must implicate water as the probable source of the
illness. For drinking water, reported outbreaks caused by con-
taminated water or ice at the point of use (e.g., a contami-
nated water faucet or serving container) are not classified as
WBDOs.
If primary cases (i.e., among persons exposed to contami-
nated water) and secondary cases (i.e., among persons who
became ill after contact with primary persons) are distinguished
on the outbreak report form, only primary cases are included
in the total number of cases. If both actual and estimated case
counts are included on the outbreak report form, the esti-
mated case count can be used if the population was sampled
randomly or the estimated count was calculated by applying
the attack rate to a standardized population.
Public water systems, which are classified as either commu-
nity or noncommunity (Glossary), are regulated under SDWA.
Of the approximately 170,000 public water systems in the
United States, 113,000 (66.5 %) are noncommunity systems,
of which 93,000 are transient systems (i.e., public water sys-
tems that regularly serve >25 of the same persons for >6
months/year [e.g., highway rest stations, restaurants, and parks
with their own public water systems]) and 20,000 are
nontransient systems (Glossary). A total of 54,000 systems
(31.8%) are community systems. Community water systems
serve approximately 264 million persons in the United States
(96.0% of the U.S. population). Approximately 11 million
persons (4.0%) rely on private or individual water systems
(24,25) (Glossary). These statistics exclude outbreaks associ-
ated with these sources because they are not intended for drink-§ Additional terms are defined in the glossary.
TABLE 1. Classification of investigations of waterborne-disease outbreaks — United States*
Class† Epidemiologic data Water-quality data
I Adequate§ Provided and adequate
Data were provided regarding exposed and unexposed persons, Historical information or laboratory data (e.g., the history that a
and the relative risk or odds ratio was >2 or the p-value was <0.05 chlorinator malfunctioned or a water main broke, no detectable free-
chlorine residual, or the presence of coliforms in the water)
II Adequate Not provided or inadequate (e.g., stating that a lake was crowded)
III Provided, but limited Provided and adequate
Epidemiologic data were provided that did not meet the criteria for
Class I, or the claim was made that ill persons had no exposures
in common besides water, but no data were provided
IV Provided, but limited Not provided or inadequate
* Outbreaks of Pseudomonas and other water-related dermatitis and single cases of primary amebic meningoencephalitis or of illness resulting from
chemical poisoning are not classified according to this scheme.† On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data that were provided on CDC form 52.12.§ Adequate data were provided to implicate water as the source of the outbreak.
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ing and are not considered to be public water systems. Also
excluded from these statistics are the millions of persons who
use noncommunity systems while traveling or working.
In this surveillance system, outbreaks associated with water
not intended for drinking (e.g., lakes, springs, and creeks used
by campers and boaters; irrigation water and other nonpotable
sources with or without taps) are also classified as individual
systems (Glossary). Sources used for bottled water are also
classified as individual systems; bottled water is not regulated
by EPA but is subject to regulation by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).
Each drinking water system associated with a WBDO is
classified as having one of the deficiencies in the following
list. If >1 deficiency is noted on the outbreak report form, the
deficiency that most likely caused the outbreak is noted.
Deficiency classifications are as follows:
1: untreated surface water;
2: untreated groundwater;
3: treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of
disinfection, chronically inadequate disinfection, or
inadequate or no filtration);
4: distribution system deficiency (e.g., cross-connection,
contamination of water mains during construction or
repair, or contamination of a storage facility); and
5: unknown or miscellaneous deficiency (e.g., contaminated
bottled water) or water source not intended for drinking
(e.g., irrigation water tap).
Recreational waters include swimming pools, wading pools,
whirlpools, hot tubs, spas, water parks, interactive fountains, and
fresh and marine surface waters. Although the WBDO surveil-
lance system includes whirlpool- and hot tub-associated outbreaks
of dermatitis caused by Pseudomonas aeruginosa, wound infec-
tions resulting from waterborne organisms are not included.
Outbreak Classification
WBDOs reported to the surveillance system are classified
according to the strength of the evidence implicating water as
the vehicle of transmission (Table 1). The classification scheme
(i.e., Classes I–IV) is based on the epidemiologic and water-
quality data provided with the outbreak report form. Epide-
miologic data are weighted more than water-quality data.
Although outbreaks without water-quality data might be
included in this summary, reports that lack epidemiologic data
were excluded. Outbreaks of dermatitis and single cases of
either primary amebic meningoencephalitis or illness result-
ing from chemical poisoning were not classified according to
this scheme. Weighting of epidemiologic data does not
preclude the relative importance of both types of data. The
purpose of the outbreak system is not only to implicate water
as the vehicle for the outbreak, but also to understand the
circumstances that led to the outbreak.
A classification of I indicates that adequate epidemiologic
and water-quality data were reported (Table 1); however, the
classification does not necessarily imply whether an investi-
gation was optimally conducted. Likewise, a classification of
II, III, or IV should not be interpreted to mean that the
investigations were inadequate or incomplete. Outbreaks and
the resulting investigations occur under various circumstances,
and not all outbreaks can or should be rigorously investigated.
In addition, outbreaks that affect fewer persons are more likely
to receive a classification of III, rather than I, on the basis of
the relatively limited sample size available for analysis.
Results
Outbreaks Associated with Drinking Water
During 1999–2000, a total of 39 outbreaks associated with
drinking water were reported by 25 states (see Appendix A for
selected case descriptions). One of the 39 outbreaks was a
multistate outbreak of Salmonella Bareilly that included cases
from 10 states. Of the 39 total drinking water outbreaks, 15
outbreaks were reported for 1999 and 24 for 2000. Florida
reported the most outbreaks (15) during this period. These
39 outbreaks caused illness among an estimated 2,068
persons; 122 persons were hospitalized, and two died. The
median number of persons affected in an outbreak was 13.5
(range: 2–781). Outbreaks peaked during the summer months
(Figure 1), June–August.
FIGURE 1. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks
associated with drinking water, by etiologic agent and month
— United States, 1999–2000 (n = 38)*
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* One outbreak of Salmonella Bareilly was not included.†Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
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TABLE 2. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water — United States, 1999 (n = 15)*
Number Type of
State Month Class† Etiologic agent of cases system§ Deficiency¶ Source Setting
California Jul III AGI** 31 Ncom 2 Well Camp
Florida Jan III AGI 4 Com 2 Well Community
Florida Jan III Giardia intestinalis 2 Ind 2 Well Household
Florida Mar III AGI 6 Com 4 River/stream Apartment
Florida Mar III AGI 3 Com 4 Well Community
Florida May III AGI 3 Ind 2 Well Household
Florida Aug III AGI†† 4 Com 4 River/stream Apartment
Missouri Jun II Salmonella Typhimurium 124 Com 3 Well Community
New Jersey Nov IV Sodium hydroxide 2 Com 3 Well Community
New Mexico Jul I Small round-structured virus§§ 70 Ncom 3 Spring Camp
New York Aug I Escherichia coli O157:H7,
Campylobacter jejuni¶¶ 781 Ncom 2 Well Fairgrounds
Texas Nov I Es. coli O157:H7 22 Com 3 Well Community
Washington Jul II AGI 46 Ind 1 River/creek Household
Washington Aug I AGI 68 Ncom 2 Well Soccer match
Wisconsin Apr NA*** Nitrate 1 Ind 2 Well Household
* An outbreak is defined as 1) >2 persons experiencing a similar illness after ingestion of drinking water and 2) epidemiologic evidence that implicates
water as the probable source of the illness.
† On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
§ Com = community; Ncom = noncommunity; Ind = individual; community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that serve >15
connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or
mobile home park with >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents. A noncommunity water system can be nontransient or transient.
Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months/year (e.g., factories or schools), whereas transient systems do not (e.g., restau-
rants, highway rest stations, or parks). Individual water systems are not owned or operated by a water utility and serve <15 connections or <25 persons.
Outbreaks associated with water not intended for drinking (e.g., lakes, springs, and creeks used by campers and boaters; irrigation water; and other
nonpotable sources with or without taps) are also classified as individual systems.
¶ 1 = untreated surface water; 2 = untreated groundwater; 3 = treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate
disinfection, and inadequate or no filtration); 4 = distribution system deficiency (e.g., cross-connection, contamination of water mains during construction
or repair, and contamination of a storage facility); and 5 = unknown or miscellaneous deficiency (e.g., contaminated bottled water).
** Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
†† Unidentified chemical poisoning.
§§ Three persons had stool specimens that tested positive for small round-structured virus, and one person’s stool specimen tested positive for Ca. jejuni.
¶¶ A total of 126 persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Es. coli O157:H7; 43 persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Ca. jejuni.
One person’s stool specimen tested positive for both organisms.
*** Not applicable, see Table 1.
Nine of the 39 (23.1%) outbreaks were assigned to Class I
on the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data; three
(7.7%) were Class II; 25 (64.1%) were Class III; and 1 was
Class IV (Table 1). One of two outbreaks associated with a
chemical etiology was not assigned a class because that
outbreak was a single case of illness resulting from nitrate
poisoning associated with consumption of water from a pri-
vate well. Outbreaks are listed by state (Tables 2 and 3) and
are tabulated by the etiologic agent, the water system type
(Table 4), and by the type of deficiency and type of water
system type (Table 5).
Etiologic Agents
Twenty (51.3%) of the 39 outbreaks were of known infec-
tious etiology; 17 (43.6%) were of unknown etiology; and
two (5.1%) were attributed to chemical poisoning. Of the
20 outbreaks with known infectious etiology, seven (35.0%)
were caused by parasites; nine (45.0%) were caused by
bacteria; and four (20.0%) were caused by viruses (Figure 2)
(Appendix A).
Parasites. Seven outbreaks affecting 57 persons were
attributed to parasitic infection: six Giardia outbreaks and
one Cryptosporidium outbreak. Six outbreaks of Giardia asso-
ciated with drinking water affected 52 persons from five states:
Florida (two outbreaks), New Mexico (one), New Hampshire
(one), Minnesota (one), and Colorado (one). These outbreaks
occurred in January (one), June (one), July (one), August (one),
and September (two). Four outbreaks were associated with
well water systems, and two were associated with surface
water systems. Two outbreaks caused by G. intestinalis involved
possible contamination of wells by animal feces. G. intestinalis
can infect mammalian hosts, which in turn, can serve as res-
ervoirs for human infection. Water treatment failure was a
factor in two other outbreaks of Giardia.
Bacteria. Nine outbreaks affecting an estimated 1,166 per-
sons were attributed to bacterial infection: four Es. coli O157:
H7 outbreaks, one Campylobacter jejuni, one Salmonella
Typhimurium, one Sa. Bareilly, and two mixed Ca. jejuni and
shiga toxin-producing Es. coli (O157:H7 or O111) outbreaks.
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TABLE 3. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water — United States, 2000 (n = 24)*
Number Type of
State Month Class† Etiologic agent of cases system§ Deficiency¶ Source Setting
California Jul I Norwalk-like virus 147 Ncom 2 Well Camp
California Jul I Escherichia coli O157:H7 5 Ind 5 River/creek Camp
California Sep III AGI** 63 Ind 5 Irrigation system Football game
Colorado Aug III Giardia intestinalis 27 Ncom 3 River Resort
Florida Mar III AGI†† 19 Com 3 Well Trailer park
Florida Apr III AGI 21 Com 3 Well Trailer park
Florida Apr I AGI 71 Ind 2 Well Community
Florida Jun III AGI§§ 2 Ind 2 Well Household
Florida Jul III AGI 3 Ind 2 Well Household
Florida Jul III AGI 3 Ind 2 Well Household
Florida Aug III AGI 4 Ind 2 Well Household
Florida Sep III G. intestinalis 2 Ind 4 Well Household
Florida Dec III Cryptosporidium parvum 5 Com 4 Well Community
Idaho Apr III Es. coli O157:H7 4 Ind 5 Irrigation canal Household
Idaho Jun III Campylobacter jejuni 15 Ncom 2 Spring Camp
Idaho Jul III AGI 65 Ncom 2 Well Restaurant
Kansas Jun III Norwalk-like virus 86 Ncom 2 Well Reception hall
Minnesota Jun III G. intestinalis¶¶ 12 Ncom 2 Well Camp
New Hampshire Sep III G. intestinalis 5 Ind 3 Well Household
New Mexico Jul II G. intestinalis 4 Ind 5 River Rafting trip
Ohio Aug I Es. coli O157:H7 29 Com 4 Surface water*** Fairgrounds
Utah Aug III Ca. jejuni††† 102 Ind 5 Irrigation water Football camp
West Virginia Jun III Norwalk-like virus 123 Ncom 3 Wells Camp
Multistate Apr–Aug I Salmonella Bareilly 84 Ind 5§§§ Municipal/spring§§§ Wells/bottled water***
* An outbreak is defined as 1) >2 persons experiencing a similar illness after ingestion of drinking water and 2) epidemiologic evidence that implicates
water as the probable source of the illness.
† On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
§ Com = community; Ncom = noncommunity; Ind = individual; community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that serve
>15 service connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community,
subdivision, or mobile home park with >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents. A noncommunity water system can be nontransient
or transient. Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months/year (e.g., factories or schools), whereas transient systems do not
(e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, or parks). Individual water systems are not owned or operated by a water utility and serve <15 connections or
<25 persons. Outbreaks associated with water not intended for drinking (e.g., lakes, springs, and creeks used by campers and boaters; irrigation water;
and other nonpotable sources with or without taps) are also classified as individual systems.
¶ 1 = untreated surface water; 2 = untreated groundwater; 3 = treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate
disinfection, and inadequate or no filtration); 4 = distribution system deficiency (e.g., cross-connection, contamination of water mains during construction
or repair, and contamination of a storage facility); and 5 = unknown or miscellaneous deficiency (e.g., contaminated bottled water).
** Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
†† Persons also reported rashes in addition to acute gastrointestinal illness.
§§ One person had a stool specimen that tested positive for Blastocystis hominis.
¶¶ Eight persons had stool specimens that tested positive for G. intestinalis; one stool specimen tested positive for Dientamoeba fragilis.
*** Type of water was not specified on report form.
††† Thirty-seven persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Ca. jejuni; four persons’ stool specimens tested positive for Es. coli O157:H7, and three
persons had stool that tested positive for Es. coli O111.
§§§ The outbreak implicated both drinking water from private wells and springs and water bottled by one facility. The bottling facility used two sources of water.
The two outbreaks with multiple pathogens caused the two
largest bacterial drinking water outbreaks reported during this
study period.
Viruses. During this period, four outbreaks involving viral
gastroenteritis were reported. A total of 426 persons reported
illness; no hospitalizations or deaths were reported in associa-
tion with these four viral outbreaks. Three of the four out-
breaks occurred in camp facilities in California, New Mexico,
and West Virginia. All three water sources were noncommunity
groundwater sources.
Chemicals. During 1999, two outbreaks involving chemi-
cal contamination were reported. A total of three persons were
affected by contamination of drinking water from nitrate and
sodium hydroxide.
Unidentified Etiologic Agents. Seventeen outbreaks
involving gastroenteritis of unknown etiology were reported
from four states, affecting an estimated 416 persons and
resulting in five hospitalizations. Testing for certain
enteric pathogens (including ova and parasite testing) was
attempted in five of the 17 outbreaks. In a June 2000
outbreak affecting 2 persons, stool specimens collected from
one person tested negative for G. intestinalis but positive for
Blastocystis hominis. However, whether B. hominis was the cause
of the reported illness is unclear, and the pathogenicity of
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TABLE 4. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water, by etiologic agent and type of water system — United
States, 1999–2000 (n = 39)
Type of water system*
Community Noncommunity Individual Total
Etiologic agent Outbreaks Cases Outbreaks Cases Outbreaks Cases Outbreaks Cases
AGI† 6§ 57 3 164 8 195 17 416
Giardia intestinalis 0 0 2 39 4 13 6 52
Escherichia coli O157:H7 2 51 0 0 2 9 4 60
Norwalk-like viruses (NLV) 0 0 3 356 0 0 3 356
Salmonella species¶ 1 124 0 0 1 84 2 208
Campylobacter jejuni 0 0 1 15 1 102 2 117
Es. coli O157:H7/Ca. jejuni 0 0 1 781 0 0 1 781
Small round-structured virus 0 0 1 70 0 0 1 70
Cryptosporidium parvum 1 5 0 0 0 0 1 5
Sodium hydroxide 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 2
Nitrate 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Total 11 239 11 1,425 17 404 39 2,068
Percentage 28.2 11.6 28.2 68.9 43.6 19.5 100.0 100.0
* Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that serve >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/
year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or mobile home park with >15 service connections or an
average of >25 residents. A noncommunity water system can be nontransient or transient. Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6
months/year (e.g., factories or schools), whereas transient systems do not (e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, or parks). Individual water systems
are not owned or operated by a water utility and serve <15 connections or <25 persons. Outbreaks associated with water not intended for drinking (e.g.,
lakes, springs, and creeks used by campers and boaters; irrigation water; and other nonpotable sources with or without taps) are also classified as
individual systems.† Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.§ One outbreak of four cases was caused by an unidentified chemical.¶ One outbreak was serotype Typhimurium, and one outbreak was serotype Bareilly.
TABLE 5. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water, by type of deficiency and type of water system —
United States, 1999–2000 (n = 39)
Type of water system*
Community Noncommunity Individual Total
Type of deficiency† Outbreaks % Outbreaks % Outbreaks % Outbreaks %
Untreated surface water 0 0 0 0 1 5.9 1 2.6
Untreated groundwater 1 9.0 8 72.7 8 47.0 17 43.6
Inadequate treatment 5 45.5 3 27.3 1 5.9 9 23.1
Distribution system 5 45.5 0 0 1 5.9 6 15.4
Miscellaneous or unknown 0 0 0 0 6 35.3 6 15.4
Total 11 100.0 11 100.0 17 100.0 39 100.0
* Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that serve >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/
year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or mobile home park with >15 service connections or an
average of >25 residents. A noncommunity water system can be nontransient or transient. Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6
months/year (e.g., factories or schools), whereas transient systems do not (e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, or parks). Individual water systems
are not owned or operated by a water utility and serve <15 connections or <25 persons. Outbreaks associated with water not intended for drinking (e.g.,
lakes, springs, and creeks used by campers and boaters; irrigation water; and other nonpotable sources with or without taps) are also classified as
individual systems.† Examples of treatment deficiencies include temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate disinfection, or inadequate or no filtration;
examples of distribution system deficiencies include cross-connection, contamination of water mains during construction or repair, or contamination of a
storage facility; and examples of unknown or miscellaneous deficiencies include contaminated bottled water.
B. hominis has been debated in the scientific community (26).
Stool specimens were negative for parasitic and bacterial
enteric pathogens in two outbreaks in Washington (July 1999
and August 1999) and in two Florida outbreaks (March 1999
and April 2000) (Appendix A).
In addition, suspected pathogens were noted in four other
outbreak reports submitted. On the basis of symptoms of ill-
ness, Norwalk-like virus (NLV) was suspected in an Idaho
outbreak among firefighters that caused 65 illnesses and four
hospitalizations, but the outbreak was not laboratory-
confirmed. G. intestinalis was suspected in an April 2000 out-
break in a Florida trailer park affecting 21 persons, on the
basis of the incubation period and symptoms reported. In
another outbreak in a Florida trailer park in March 2000
among 19 persons, a bacterial pathogen was suspected as the
cause of the outbreak on the basis of the symptoms, which
included conjunctivitis and dermatitis in addition to gastro-
enteritis. A chemical agent was suspected as the cause of ill-
ness among four residents in a Florida apartment building
who had a cross-connection between their drinking water and
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a toilet flush-valve. The residents of the apartment had noted
blue tap water before onset of illness on multiple occasions
before an improper flush valve in the toilet tank was discovered.
Four outbreaks of gastroenteritis were associated with con-
sumption of untreated water from private wells. These four
outbreaks occurred in Florida and affected 3–4 persons each.
In July 2000, flooding was a possible contributor to two out-
breaks. Water in each of the homes tested positive for coliforms
and did not have adequate disinfection.
Water-Quality Data
Water-quality data (i.e., information regarding the presence
of coliform bacteria, pathogens, or chemical contaminants)
were available for 35 (89.7%) of the 39 drinking water out-
breaks. Two reports of outbreaks of confirmed or suspected
infectious etiology and two reports of outbreaks of confirmed
or suspected chemical etiology did not provide water-quality
data.
Of the 36 reports of outbreaks with a suspected or con-
firmed infectious etiology, 33 outbreaks provided water-quality
data. Twenty-six (78.8%) of the 33 outbreaks with a suspected
or confirmed infectious etiology reported a positive coliform,
total coliform, or fecal coliform result. Organisms also were
detected in the water in two of these outbreaks. In August
2000, Ca. jejuni was detected in the water in a mixed
Ca. jejuni/Es. coli O157:H7 outbreak in Utah, although shiga
toxins were not detected. Es. coli
O157:H7 was found in the water in
a July 2000 California outbreak. In
a 2000 Colorado outbreak, the pres-
ence of G. intestinalis was demon-
strated in a sample from the water
holding tank, despite the lack of
coliform data.
Of the three outbreaks with either
a confirmed or suspected chemical
etiology, only one demonstrated that
the chemical had been directly in the
water. Tap water was tested after the
health department was notified that
an infant had methemoglobinemia.
Both fecal coliforms and 28 mg/L
of nitrate were detected in the
water. For an outbreak where burns
and gastroenteritis were  reported
and linked to a sodium hydroxide
spill, a pH test of the water that
could indicate whether NaOH or
another basic substance had spilled
into the water was not documented.
However, the environmental assessment indicated the tank
contents had emptied into the water. A third suspected chemi-
cal outbreak involving a cross-connection between a toilet
flush-valve and the drinking water system did not have water-
quality data available.
In 11 of the 35 outbreaks, water was not sampled for
coliforms until >1 month after the first case associated with
the outbreak was reported (range: 5–16 weeks). In four of
these 11 outbreaks, the water samples did not test positive for
coliforms (fecal or total), chemicals, or pathogens. Instead,
these were confirmed as outbreaks by epidemiologic data or
by reports that treatment deficiencies had occurred.
Water Systems and Water Sources
Eleven (28.2%) of the 39 drinking water outbreaks were
associated with community systems, 11 (28.2%) with non-
community systems, and 17 (43.6%) with individual water
systems (Tables 4 and 5). Ten (25.6%) of the 39 drinking
water outbreaks were associated with surface water, including
three outbreaks that implicated irrigation water not intended
for consumption. Twenty-nine (74.4%) of the 39 drinking
water outbreaks, including the outbreak associated with
bottled water, were associated with groundwater sources (wells
and springs).
Five (45.5%) of the 11 outbreaks associated with commu-
nity water systems were caused by treatment deficiencies; one
Unidentified
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Bacterial
23.1%
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5.1%
Parasitic
17.9%
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28.2%
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43.6%
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28.2%
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Irrigation system
7.9%
Surface water
18.4%
Treatment
deficiency
23.1%
Untreated
groundwater
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Distribution system
15.4%
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15.4%
Viral
10.3%
Untreated surface
water 2.6%
Etiologic agent (n = 39) Water system (n = 39)
Water source (n = 38)* Deficiency (n = 39)
FIGURE 2. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water, by etiologic agent,
water system, water source, and deficiency — United States, 1999–2000 (n = 39)
* One outbreak of Salmonella Bareilly was not included.
12 MMWR November 22, 2002
(9.0%) outbreak was related to contaminated, untreated
groundwater, and five (45.5%) outbreaks were related to
problems in the water distribution system. Two of the five
distribution system problems were related to cross-connections
between the distribution system and an irrigation well. The
third outbreak related to a community water source had a
household cross-connection between the toilet water and main
kitchen tap. One outbreak of Cr. parvum (Florida, December
2000) was related to a repeated history of water main breaks.
In another outbreak in Ohio in August 2000, deficiencies in
the distribution system of a fairgrounds might have allowed
back-siphonage of animal manure into the water used by food
and beverage vendors.
Ten (90.1%) of 11 outbreaks associated with noncommu-
nity water systems occurred in groundwater systems. Seven of
the 10 groundwater outbreaks were linked to untreated wells,
and one of the 10 involved consumption of untreated spring
water. Two of the 10 outbreaks were related to treatment
deficiencies in water taken from wells or a spring and
were associated with outbreaks of NLV and a small round-
structured virus. An outbreak associated with G. intestinalis
related to consumption of surface water occurred when a pump
failure and a defective filter cartridge resulted in river water
entering the drinking water holding tank without filtration.
No information concerning chlorine levels from water samples
was provided.
Nine (52.9%) of 17 outbreaks associated with individual
water systems occurred in groundwater systems. Eight of these
groundwater systems were wells that were not treated rou-
tinely; one outbreak of giardiasis occurred when the filtration
system for a well was inadvertently turned off. Five (31.3%)
TABLE 6. Waterborne-disease outbreaks of gastroenteritis associated with recreational water — United States, 1999 (n = 15)
Number
State Month Class* Etiologic agent Illness  of cases Source Setting
California Jun III AGI† Gastroenteritis 23 Pool Apartment complex
Connecticut Jul II Escherichia coli O121:H19 Gastroenteritis 11 Lake Lake
Florida Mar III Campylobacter jejuni Gastroenteritis 6 Pool Private home
Florida Aug I Shigella sonnei, Interactive
Cryptosporidium parvum§ Gastroenteritis 38 fountain Beach park
Florida Aug IV Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 6 Pool Private home
Florida Sep III Es. coli O157:H7 Gastroenteritis 2 Ditch water Community
Idaho Jun IV Norwalk-like virus Gastroenteritis 25 Hot springs Resort
Illinois Jun III AGI Gastroenteritis 25 Lake Lake
Massachusetts Jul III Giardia intestinalis Gastroenteritis 18 Pond Pond
Minnesota Jul III Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 10 Pool Trailer park
Nebraska Jun IV Es. coli O157:H7 Gastroenteritis 7 Wading pool Child care center
New York Jun II Norwalk-like virus Gastroenteritis 168 Lake County park
Washington Aug I Es. coli O157:H7 Gastroenteritis 36 Lake State park
Wisconsin Jul IV Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 10 Pool Municipal pool
Wisconsin Aug II Es. coli O157:H7 Gastroenteritis 5 Lake/pond Swimming beach
* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.†Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.§Five persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Shigella sonnei; two stools tested positive for Cryptosporidium parvum.
of the 16 outbreaks occurred when persons drank water not
intended for direct consumption from irrigation systems or
when they consumed surface water that had been ineffectively
or improperly treated. One (6.3%) of the 16 outbreaks in a
system occurred in a home where creek water on the property
was directly consumed without treatment.
Of the nine bacterial outbreaks, four occurred in ground-
water systems (one was associated with a deficiency in the
distribution system, one with a treatment deficiency, and two
occurred in untreated systems). Six of seven parasitic outbreaks
occurred in groundwater systems: three occurred in untreated
systems; two involved problems in the distribution system;
and one was related to a treatment deficiency. All four viral
outbreaks occurred in noncommunity groundwater systems.
Two occurred in untreated wells, and two were related to treat-
ment deficiencies in a spring and well. Two chemical out-
breaks were related to treatment deficiencies in well water.
Fourteen of the 17 outbreaks of unknown etiology were linked
to groundwater systems. Ten of these 14 outbreaks occurred
in untreated systems; two were related to distribution system
problems, and two were related to treatment deficiencies.
Outbreaks Associated
with Recreational Water
During 1999–2000, a total of 23 states reported 59 out-
breaks associated with recreational water (Tables 6–9)
(see Appendix B for selected case descriptions). Twenty-three
outbreaks were reported for 1999, and 36 for 2000. The states
that reported the largest number of outbreaks were Florida
(14 outbreaks) and Minnesota (eight outbreaks). These
Vol. 51 / SS-8 Surveillance Summaries 13
TABLE 7. Waterborne-disease outbreaks of gastroenteritis associated with recreational water — United States, 2000 (n = 21)
Number
State Month Class* Etiologic agent Illness  of cases Source Setting
Colorado Aug I Cryptosporidium parvum Gastroenteritis 112 Pool Municipal pool
Florida May IV AGI† Gastroenteritis 2 Lake Lake
Florida Jul III AGI Gastroenteritis 4 Outdoor spring County park
Florida Jul III Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 3 Pool Apartment complex
Florida Aug III Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 5 Pool Country club
Florida Aug I Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 19 Pool Resort
Florida Aug III AGI Gastroenteritis 9 Pool Motel
Florida Aug III Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 5 Pool Condominium
Georgia Jun II Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 36 Pools§ Community
Maine Jul II AGI Gastroenteritis 32 Lake/pond Swimming beach
Minnesota Jul II Cr. parvum¶ Gastroenteritis 220 Lake Swimming beach
Minnesota Jul IV Shigella sonnei** Gastroenteritis 15 Lake/pond Swimming beach
Minnesota Jul III Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 7 Pool Day camp
Minnesota Jul II Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 6 Pool Hotel
Minnesota Aug II Sh. sonnei Gastroenteritis 25 Lake Public beach
Minnesota Aug IV Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 4 Pool Municipal pool
Missouri Sep III Shigella flexneri Gastroenteritis 6 Wading pool Community
Nebraska Jun I Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 225 Pools Community
Ohio Jun I Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 700 Pool Private swim club
South Carolina Jul IV Cr. parvum Gastroenteritis 26 Pool Community
Wisconsin Jan IV Norwalk-like virus Gastroenteritis 9 Pool Motel
* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
† Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
§ Persons swam in a community pool and an inflatable pool.
¶ Seventeen persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Cr. parvum. One person had a stool specimen that tested positive for Giardia intestinalis.
One person had a stool specimen that tested positive for both organisms.
** Fourteen of 15 stool specimens tested positive for Shigella; one person tested positive for Cr. parvum; and one tested positive for both.
TABLE 8. Waterborne-disease outbreaks of meningoencephalitis, keratitis, leptospirosis, and Pontiac fever associated with
recreational water — United States, 1999–2000 (n = 8)
Number
State Year Month Class* Etiologic agent Illness  of cases Source Setting
California 2000 Apr NA† Naegleria fowleri Meningoencephalitis 1 Mudhole Mudhole
Florida 1999 Oct NA N. fowleri Meningoencephalitis 1 Pond Pond
Florida 2000 —§ NA N. fowleri Meningoencephalitis 1 — —
Guam 2000 Jul II Leptospira interrogans Leptospirosis 21 Lake Adventure race
Vermont 2000 Feb NA Bromine Chemical keratitis 3 Pool Pool
Texas 1999 Sep II Unknown¶ Acute respiratory infection 12 Hot tub Ranch
Texas 2000 Jul NA N. fowleri Meningoencephalitis 1 Lake Lake
Wisconsin 2000 May I Legionella pneumophila Pontiac fever 20 Whirlpool Motel
* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.† Not applicable.§ The month the outbreak occurred was not reported; the source and setting were not reported.¶ Clinical specimens tested negative for Legionella pneumophila serotypes 1 and 6, adenovirus, influenza virus, and parainfluenza virus.
59 outbreaks affected 2,093 persons and resulted in 25 hospi-
talizations and four deaths. The median size of the outbreak
was 10 persons (range: 1–700).
Of the 59 outbreaks, 36 were outbreaks of gastroenteritis
(Tables 6 and 7); 15 were outbreaks of dermatitis (Table 9);
four were cases of meningoencephalitis; and the remaining
four outbreaks were of leptospirosis, chemical keratitis, acute
respiratory infection of unknown etiology, and Pontiac fever
(Table 8). Thirty-one (86.1%) of the 36 outbreaks involving
gastroenteritis occurred during the summer months (i.e., June–
August) (Figure 3). Outbreaks of dermatitis associated with
recreational water contact were reported more frequently in
February, March, June, and July. The four cases of primary
amebic meningoencephalitis occurred in the warmer months
(April–October).
Etiologic Agents
Of the 59 recreational water outbreaks, 44 (74.6%) were of
known infectious etiology (Tables 6–9). Of the 36 outbreaks
involving gastroenteritis, 17 (47.2%) were caused by para-
sites; nine (25.0%) by bacteria; three (8.3%) by viruses; one
(2.8%) by a combination of parasites and bacteria; and the
remaining six (16.7%) were of unknown etiology (Figure 4).
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FIGURE 3. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks
associated with recreational water, by illness and month —
United States, 1999–2000 (n = 58)*
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* Information regarding the month was not provided for one outbreak of
meningoencephalitis.
TABLE 9. Waterborne-disease outbreaks of dermatitis associated with recreational water — United States, 1999–2000 (n = 15)
Number
State Year Month Class* Etiologic agent  of cases Source Setting
Alaska 2000 Oct NA† Pseudomonas aeruginosa§ 29 Pool/hot tub Hotel
Arkansas 1999 Jun NA P. aeruginosa§ 10 Pool Community
Arkansas 2000 Feb NA P. aeruginosa§ 26 Pool/ hot tub Motel
California 2000 Jun IV Schistosomes** 6 Pond Pond
California 2000 Jul IV Schistosomes** 4 Pond Pond
Colorado 1999 Feb NA P. aeruginosa¶§ 19 Hot tub Hotel
Colorado 1999 Dec NA P. aeruginosa†† 5 Hot tub Ski lodge
Florida 2000 Aug NA P. aeruginosa†† 6 Hot tub Apartment complex
Maine 2000 Feb NA P. aeruginosa¶ 9 Hot tub/pool Hotel
Maine 2000 Mar NA P. aeruginosa§ 11 Hot tub Hotel
Minnesota 2000 Dec NA P. aeruginosa¶ 16 Hot tub Private
Oregon 1999 Jul IV Schistosomes** 2 Lake Lake
Vermont 1999 Jun NA P. aeruginosa†† 9 Hot tub Hotel
Vermont 1999 Feb NA P. aeruginosa†† 11 Hot tub Vacation home
Washington 2000 Mar NA P. aeruginosa†† 10 Pool/hot tub Motel
* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
† Not applicable.
§ Organism isolated from water.
¶ Laboratory-confirmed case.
** Suspected etiology on the basis of clinical syndrome and setting.
†† Suspected etiology on the basis of clinical syndrome.
Of the 23 nongastroenteritis-related recreational outbreaks,
seven were attributed to P. aeruginosa, four to free-living amoe-
bae, one to Leptospira species, one to Legionella species, and
one to bromine (Tables 8 and 9). Nine nongastroenteritis-
related recreational outbreaks were of unknown etiology, eight
of which were suspected but not confirmed to be caused by
P. aeruginosa or schistosomes. The ninth outbreak of unknown
etiology was suspected to be caused by a virus or by Legionella
pneumophila on the basis of observed symptoms and the epi-
demiologically implicated vehicle of transmission. Of the 59
recreational water outbreaks, 21 (35.6%) were associated with
fresh or surface water, and 37 (62.7%) with treated (e.g., chlo-
rinated) water. Information regarding the water venue for an
outbreak of meningoencephalitis was not provided.
Parasites. Sixteen of the 17 parasitic recreational water out-
breaks involving gastroenteritis were caused by Cr. parvum.
The seventeenth outbreak was caused by G. intestinalis.
Fifteen of the 17 parasitic outbreaks occurred in chlorinated
venues; in these outbreaks, inadequate treatment, disrupted
chlorine disinfection, or suboptimal pool maintenance were
contributing factors to the outbreaks. Cr. parvum is highly
resistant to chlorine disinfection and can survive for days in
adequately chlorinated pools; therefore, suboptimal chlori-
nation of the pool might not be the sole factor contributing
to the occurrence of an outbreak.
Three outbreaks of laboratory-confirmed cryptosporidiosis
occurred during the 1999 summer swim season. During the
2000 summer swim season, three substantial outbreaks of
Cr. parvum occurred that were related to swimming in
municipal pools. In August 2000, an outbreak occurred in
Colorado that affected 112 persons attending a private pool
party. In June 2000, the two other cryptosporidiosis outbreaks,
one in Ohio affecting 700 persons and the other in Nebraska
affecting 225 persons (27), occurred among members of pri-
vate swim clubs. In both outbreaks, the protracted nature of
the outbreaks during >2 months was the result of repeated
recontamination of the pools by infected persons continuing
to swim; 37 (18%) of 205 persons interviewed in the
Nebraska outbreak admitted to swimming while symptom-
atic, and 32% swam while ill or during the 2 weeks after their
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illness (27). Another outbreak (Florida, August 2000) was
associated with the outbreak that occurred in Ohio. A family
who were members of the implicated swim club in the Ohio
outbreak were vacationing with a sick child. While in a pool
in Florida, the infant had two fecal accidents. The resulting
outbreak caused five cases of diarrheal illness and two hospi-
talizations.
Eight other outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis occurred in
treated venues during the 2000 swim season. Two outbreaks
of gastroenteritis occurred in untreated venues: one in a fresh-
water lake in Minnesota in July 2000 and one in a Massachu-
setts pond in July 1999 (Appendix B).
Four cases of laboratory-confirmed primary amebic men-
ingoencephalitis attributed to Naegleria fowleri occurred dur-
ing this 2-year reporting period. All four persons were aged
<19 years. Three of the persons died from infection after hav-
ing contact with a pond, lake, or mud hole. The fourth person’s
freshwater exposure could not be determined; that person had
fallen from a jet ski into an unspecified body of water, sus-
tained injuries, and died from an infection shortly after it was
detected.
Bacteria. Nine recreational outbreaks involving gastroen-
teritis were attributed to bacterial pathogens, and five of the
nine were linked to freshwater sources. Five cases (Wisconsin,
August 1999) of Es. coli O157:H7 occurred among persons
who had visited the same swimming
beach. After a review of potential risk
factors, the only common link found
was swimming at the implicated
beach. The popular beach
featured a shallow, dammed area that
was used for wading. Total and fecal
coliforms were detected in water
samples collected before and during
the outbreak, although the levels
detected did not exceed levels of
EPA-recommended guidelines for
microbiologic quality of water (22).
One sample that was tested for
Es. coli O157:H7 was negative.
Es. coli O157:H7 was implicated in
another outbreak among 36 persons
(August 1999) who visited a state park
in Washington. Es. coli O121:H19 was
implicated in an outbreak in a Con-
necticut community (July 2000).
Shigella sonnei was implicated in two
outbreaks that occurred at swimming
beaches in Minnesota (July and
August 2000).
Nonfreshwater sources were implicated in four bacterial
recreational water outbreaks involving gastroenteritis. In
March 1999, an outbreak of Ca. jejuni was associated with a
private pool in Florida that did not have continuous chlorine
disinfection and reportedly had ducks swimming in the pool.
Outbreaks of Shigella flexneri and Es. coli O157:H7 (Mis-
souri, September 2000 and Nebraska, June 1999) occurred
among children using unchlorinated wading pools. Fecal
accidents were factors contributing to the contamination of
the water in both outbreaks. Es. coli O157:H7 also was impli-
cated as a cause of illness in an outbreak (Florida, September
1999) among two young children who had been playing in
ditch water. Both clinical specimens and water samples tested
positive for Es. coli O157:H7.
Two nongastroenteritis-related recreational water outbreaks
were also reported. One outbreak of leptospirosis was reported
among 21 persons who participated in an adventure race in
Guam in July 2000 (Table 8). These persons reported mul-
tiple outdoor exposures, including running through jungles
and savannahs, swimming in a river and a reservoir, and bicy-
cling and kayaking in the ocean. Leptospira was confirmed by
serology, and an epidemiologic investigation demonstrated
that swimming in the reservoir, submerging one’s head in the
water, and swallowing water while swimming were risk fac-
tors for illness. Water samples were not tested, and an
FIGURE 4. Waterborne-disease outbreaks of gastroenteritis associated with recreational
water, by etiologic agent and type of exposure — United States, 1999–2000
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environmental assessment of the reservoir was not conducted.
The second nongastroenteritis-related recreational water out-
break was an outbreak of Pontiac fever epidemiologically
linked to use of a whirlpool at a hotel.
Viruses. During 1999–2000, three outbreaks of NLV
(Calicivirus) that affected a total of 202 persons were reported.
Two NLV outbreaks occurred in untreated systems; one out-
break of NLV occurred (Idaho, June 1999) at a resort and
water park and affected 25 persons. The pool implicated in
the investigation was untreated because the source of the pool’s
water was a natural hot springs that was high in mineral con-
tent. The investigators noted that geothermal pools used for
swimming are not required to be regulated by public health
officials in that locale. The pool implicated by the
investigation also had been implicated in a previous outbreak
of NLV in June 1996.
Other. During 1999–2000, six recreational water outbreaks
involving gastroenteritis of unknown etiology were reported.
One outbreak (Florida, August) involved a motel pool that
was cloudy and dirty at the time of exposure. Nine persons
who swam in this pool and did not share any other common
exposure became ill with gastroenteritis. Disinfectant residu-
als and operation of the filtration system at the time of the
investigation were deficient. Problems were also noted with
the equipment used for adjusting pH.
Another outbreak (Florida, August 1999) among 38 per-
sons who visited a beach park was attributed to both Sh. sonnei
and Cr. parvum (28). Illness was epidemiologically linked to
playing in an interactive fountain at the park, ingesting water,
and consuming food and beverages at the fountain. The
fountain’s recirculation, filtration, and disinfection systems
were not approved by the health department and were inad-
equate or not completely operational at the time of its use.
Samples of the fountain water tested positive for coliforms
but did not test positive for fecal coliforms. Nevertheless, the
cause of the outbreak was determined to be the fountain, which
was closed until the health department’s concerns could be
remedied.
Three cases of chemical keratitis (Vermont, February 2000)
resulted from exposure to bromine in a hotel swimming pool.
Bromine levels were >5 ppm (acceptable bromine levels are
1–3 ppm), and the pH level was >8.5. Patrons who spent
time with their heads underwater with their eyes open were
affected.
Twelve persons affected in an outbreak (Texas, September
1999) reported symptoms that included exhaustion, sore
muscles, headache, chills, and fever after attending a confer-
ence at a guest ranch. One woman reported a miscarriage
during her illness. Exposure to a hot tub, defined as either
immersion or being near the hot tub, was associated with
illness. Although clinical specimens (urine, blood, sputum,
and throat swabs) were tested for organisms, including
Leg. pneumophila serogroups 1 and 6, influenza virus, parain-
fluenza virus, and adenovirus, no infectious agent was identi-
fied. No testing for biologic or chemical agents was performed
on water samples because the hot tub had already been drained,
refilled, and hyperchlorinated before the environmental
investigation.
During the 1999–2000 reporting period, 15 outbreaks of
dermatitis were identified (Table 9). Three of these outbreaks
were associated with swimming in freshwater and were
assumed to be cercarial dermatitis caused by contact with the
larval form (cercariae) of schistosomes, which are present in
freshwater environments. Two of these dermatitis outbreaks
occurred in lakes in California that were associated with past
cases of cercarial dermatitis. The onset of dermatitis occurred
within hours after swimming in the lake and resolved after a
limited number of days (median days of illness were 2 and 3
days [range: 2–3 and 3–5 days], respectively). The 12 remain-
ing outbreaks were associated with pool and hot tub use and
affected 5–29 persons each. P. aeruginosa was confirmed in
clinical isolates in 3 of the 12 outbreaks and was confirmed
in water/filter samples in five outbreaks, two of which also
had a clinical isolate. In eight of these outbreaks of dermati-
tis, specific treatment deficiencies or problems were identi-
fied. Outbreaks in Arkansas (June 1999), Florida (August
2000), Colorado (December 1999), and Washington (March
2000) were attributed to deficiencies in treatment.
In one outbreak of dermatitis (Maine, February 2000), nine
persons reported rash in addition to headache, fever, fatigue,
and sore throat (29). Swimming in the hot tub or swimming
in the pool was a risk factor. The pool and hot tub were on
separate filtration systems, and both were used by the major-
ity of persons in the outbreak. Low levels of free chlorine were
found in the pool and hot tub, but the presence of chlorinate
isocyanurates (chlorine stabilizers) might have influenced
measured levels of free chlorine. A clinical isolate of P. eruginosa
was obtained from an ill person; P. aeruginosa also was isolated
from the pool filter even after the pool had been cleaned twice.
P. aeruginosa was isolated from clinical specimens and
water samples in an outbreak at a Colorado hotel that
affected 19 persons in February 1999 (28), 13 of whom were
children aged <15 years. Symptoms were not limited to rash;
they included diarrhea, vomiting, nausea, fever, fatigue, muscle
aches, joint pain, swollen lymph nodes, and subcutaneous
nodules on hands and feet. Because of the severity and range
of symptoms, clinical specimens were examined for enteric
bacterial and parasitic pathogens as well as Legionella species,
Leptospira species, and Entamoeba histolytica but did not test
positive for any of these etiologic agents. Swabs taken from
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TABLE 10. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with occupational exposures — United States, 1999–2000 (n = 2)
Number
State Year Month Class* Etiologic agent Exposure  of cases Source Setting
Hawaii 1999 Aug IV Leptospira Contact with pond water 2 Pond Outdoor landscaping
Minnesota 2000 Aug III Pontiac fever† High-pressure cleaning 15 Plant lagoon Sugar beet plant
using lagoon water
* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.†Endotoxin was also isolated from environmental samples; the role of endotoxin is unclear.
the hot tub floor and rail were positive for P. aeruginosa and
other Pseudomonas species. Pool and hot tub records indicated
that chlorine and pH had declined below the state-mandated
levels at the time of exposure. Epidemiologic evidence impli-
cated the hot tub as the likely vehicle of exposure for the out-
break. In both the Colorado outbreak and the Maine outbreak
that occurred in February 2000, an offsite contractor had been
engaged to monitor disinfectant and pH levels. Insufficient
communication between pool staff and the remote monitor-
ing company might have contributed to extended periods of
usage with inadequate disinfection (28).
Outbreaks Associated with Occupational
Exposure to Water
Two outbreaks not associated with drinking or recreational
water exposure were reported during this period (Table 10).
One outbreak of leptospirosis (Hawaii, August 1999) occurred
among persons landscaping a pond. Leptospirosis was con-
firmed serologically for the two persons who had contact with
the pond. Both persons reported multiple skin abrasions and
were exposed to the pond water for a period of 5–10 days.
One of the two persons was hospitalized.
An outbreak of acute respiratory illness occurred among
sugar beet processing plant workers (Minnesota, August 2000).
Of the 15 cases identified, 13 were hospitalized. Serology for
4 (26.7%) of the 15 persons tested positive for Leg.
pneumophila; three (20.0%) persons were confirmed positive
for Leg. pneumophila by sputum polymerase chain reaction
(PCR). Fourteen (93.3%) of the 15 persons worked on a crew
that had performed high-pressure cleaning in one area of the
plant; the fifteenth patient had conducted high-pressure clean-
ing elsewhere in the plant. The sources of water for the high-
pressure cleaning contained 105 colony-forming unit (CFU)/
mL of Leg. pneumophila and endotoxin levels of 22,200
endotoxin units/mL. Although the attack rate, symptoms, and
laboratory findings were consistent with an outbreak of Pontiac
fever, endotoxin exposure might have contributed to this
outbreak.
Previously Unreported Outbreaks
Three previously unreported drinking water outbreaks that
occurred in 1995 and 1997 were submitted during this
reporting period (Table 11). An illegal cross-connection
(Washington, July 1995) between a domestic water supply
TABLE 11. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water that were not included in the previous surveillance
summaries — United States, 1995–1997 (n = 3)*
Number Type of
State Year Month Class* Etiologic agent of cases system§ Deficiency¶  Source Setting
Washington 1995 Jul III Giardia intestinalis** 87 Com 4 Well Community
California 1997 Nov III Nitrite (sodium metaborite) 7 Com 4 Mixed river/groundwater Hospital cafeteria
New York 1997 Dec I Norwalk-like virus 1,450 Ncom 3 Well Ski resort
* An outbreak is defined as 1) >2 persons experiencing a similar illness after either ingestion of drinking water or exposure to water used for recreational
purposes and 2) epidemiologic evidence that implicates water as the probable source of illness.
† On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
§ Com = community; Ncom = noncommunity; Ind = individual; Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that serve >15
connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or
mobile home park with >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents. A noncommunity water system can be nontransient or transient. Nontransient
systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months/year (e.g., factories or schools), whereas transient systems do not (e.g., restaurants, highway rest
stations, or parks). Individual water systems are not owned or operated by a water utility and serve <15 connections or <25 persons. Outbreaks associated
with water not intended for drinking (e.g., lakes, springs, and creeks used by campers and boaters; irrigation water; and other nonpotable sources with or
without taps) are also classified as individual systems.
¶ 1 = untreated surface water; 2 = untreated groundwater; 3 = treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate
disinfection, and inadequate or no filtration); 4 = distribution system deficiency (e.g., cross-connection, contamination of water mains during construction
or repair, and contamination of a storage facility); and 5 = unknown or miscellaneous deficiency (e.g., contaminated bottled water).
** Thirty-three persons had stool specimens that tested positive for G. intestinalis. One specimen tested positive for Entamoeba coli. One other specimen
tested positive for Blastocystis hominis. One cultured specimen tested positive for Campylobacter jejuni.
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and an irrigation system at a plant nursery resulted in con-
tamination of multiple wells in a community. Eighty-seven
cases of gastroenteritis were reported, and one hospitalization
was recorded. G. intestinalis was determined in 33 (52.4%) of
63 stool specimens; Entamoeba coli and B. hominis were each
found in one stool specimen. One (7.1%) of 14 stool speci-
mens that were cultured for Ca. jejuni tested positive.
NLV was implicated as the cause of an outbreak (New York,
December 1997) of 1,450 cases at a restaurant at a ski resort.
Epidemiologic data implicated water or consumption of ice
made from water as the cause of the outbreak. The environ-
mental assessment revealed possible problems with the well
operation and location. The chlorinator for the well had been
malfunctioning and had already been disconnected before the
assessment. Testing of the water by the local health depart-
ment determined that neither a free nor total chlorine residual
was detectable in the potable water supply and indicated the
presence of fecal coliforms. In addition, the well was located
<24 inches away from a stream. During the period the chlori-
nator was not functioning, the pump for the well had been
continuously pumping water. Surface water that might have
been introduced into the water supply, plus a deficiency in
treatment of the water, played a key role in the outbreak.
Seven persons who were either employees or visitors at a
hospital (California, November 1997) were symptomatic for
methemoglobinemia in one outbreak. An epidemiologic
investigation indicated that the only shared exposure among
these persons was a visit to the hospital cafeteria and the con-
sumption of a carbonated beverage with ice from the self-
service soda dispenser. The onset of symptoms occurred 1–5
minutes after or while drinking a carbonated beverage. One
person was hospitalized, and no deaths occurred. The envi-
ronmental investigation discovered a cross-connection in the
plumbing system that might have allowed water from the cool-
ing tower, which had been recently shock-treated with
sodium metaborate, to be drawn into the drinking water sys-
tem. Sodium metaborate has been associated with nitrate poi-
soning and methemoglobinemia in past incidents (30).
Outbreaks Not Classified as WBDOs
Outbreaks attributed to drinking water that was contami-
nated or potentially contaminated at the point of use rather
than at the source or in the distribution system are not classi-
fied as WBDOs. Six outbreaks, causing illness among a total
of 102 persons, are in this category. None of the six outbreaks
reflected a common vehicle of contamination: one outbreak
of Cr. parvum was epidemiologically associated with ice con-
sumption; a school-based outbreak of Sh. sonnei was related
to consumption of water from a dispenser stored in a
bathroom facility; a third outbreak involved water taken from
a garden hose (the water had been stored in an ice chest
before consumption at a private residence); and a fourth out-
break associated with bottled water that might have been con-
taminated at the point of use. Two of the six reported
point-of-use outbreaks involving a suspected chemical expo-
sure occurred in food service facilities, but water testing was
not performed to verify the presence of the chemical; and,
because of the relatively limited number of cases associated
with these incidents, the epidemiologic information was not
adequate to include these incidents as outbreaks.
Data from six other possible or confirmed outbreaks were
also not included in this analysis. One confirmed outbreak of
leptospirosis was related to travel outside the United States or
its territories and therefore was excluded. This outbreak
occurred among student travelers who became ill after their
return from Ecuador. Three cases of leptospirosis were con-
firmed by laboratory testing among the cohort, and four
additional cases were suspected. Three other outbreaks of
G. intestinalis, Cr. parvum, and NLV could not be included
in the analysis. Although these outbreaks were probably caused
by a recreational water exposure, the data provided did not
meet the criteria for inclusion (i.e., the outbreaks did not meet
the criteria for Classes I–IV).
Two additional outbreaks were excluded because of inad-
equate information: one outbreak of dermatitis caused by
in-home bathing and one potential drinking water outbreak
of Cr. parvum in a New England community. This outbreak
of Cr. parvum occurred in a community near another reported
community outbreak of G. intestinalis and Cr. parvum in 1999.
The pond implicated in the recreational water outbreak of
G. intestinalis also served as a surface water source, which was
intermittently mixed into the municipal drinking water that
supplied the community. However, not all the persons received
their drinking water from the municipal water source.
Although raw surface water samples later tested positive for
Cr. parvum by immunomagnetic spectroscopy (IMS), house-
hold water samples either tested negative, were not tested, or
the results were not provided. The epidemiologic informa-
tion and water-quality information provided were not con-
clusive.
Discussion
Considerations Regarding Reported
Results
The WBDO surveillance system provides information con-
cerning epidemiologic and etiologic trends in outbreaks. In
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where the majority of outbreaks actually occurred. An increase
in the number of outbreaks reported could either reflect an
actual increase in outbreaks or an improved sensitivity in
surveillance practices.
Recognition of WBDOs also is dependent on certain out-
break characteristics; outbreaks associated with serious illness
or affecting a substantial number of persons are more likely
to receive attention from health authorities. Outbreaks
involving acute diseases, including those characterized by a
FIGURE 5. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water, by
year and etiologic agent — United States, 1971–2000 (n = 730)*
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* The total from previous reports has been corrected from n = 691 to n = 688.†Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
FIGURE 6. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water, by
year and type of water system — United States, 1971–2000 (n = 730)*
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998
Year
Individual
Noncommunity
Community
N
um
be
r o
f o
ut
br
ea
ks
* The total from previous reports has been corrected from n = 691 to n = 688.
previous years, a decrease in the number of drinking water-
associated outbreaks had been observed. However, the
cumulative number of drinking water outbreaks reported for
the 1999–2000 period demonstrates a reversal of this trend
(Figures 5 and 6). The number of recreational water outbreaks
has been gradually increasing for the past 15 years and is at
the highest level since CDC began receiving such reports in
1978.
Although the number of outbreaks reported through
the surveillance system has
increased, the significance of this
increase is unclear. Whether this
indeed reflects a true increase in the
number of outbreaks that occurred
in the United States is unknown.
Not all outbreaks are recognized,
investigated, and then reported to
CDC or EPA, and studies have not
been performed that assess the sen-
sitivity of this system and indicate
what percentage of actual out-
breaks this system is able to detect.
Multiple factors exist that can
influence whether WBDOs are
recognized and investigated by
local, territorial, and state public
health agencies: the size of the out-
break; severity of disease caused by
the outbreak; public awareness of
the outbreak; routine laboratory
testing for organisms; require-
ments for reporting cases of dis-
eases; and resources available to the
local health departments for sur-
veillance and investigation of prob-
able outbreaks. This surveillance
system probably underreports the
true number of outbreaks because
of the multiple steps required
before an outbreak is identified
and investigated. In addition,
changes in the capacity of local,
county, and state public health
agencies and laboratories to detect
an outbreak might influence the
numbers of outbreaks reported in
each state relative to other states.
The states with the majority of
outbreaks reported during this
period might not be the states
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short incubation period, are more readily identified than
outbreaks associated with chronic, low-level exposure to an
agent (e.g., certain chemicals) or are associated with organ-
isms that have a longer incubation period (e.g., certain para-
sitic organisms). Outbreaks involving larger drinking water
systems (e.g., community systems) are more likely to be
detected than outbreaks that involve noncommunity systems
because these systems serve mostly nonresidential areas and
transient populations. Outbreaks associated with individual
systems are the most likely to be underreported because they
typically involve a limited number of persons. Recreational
outbreaks where persons congregate in one venue and then
are geographically dispersed can be difficult to document.
The identification of the etiologic agent of a WBDO
depends on the timely recognition of the outbreak so that
appropriate clinical and environmental samples can be col-
lected. The laboratory involved in the testing of specimens
must have the capacity and capability to test for a particular
organism. In certain cases, specific tests must be requested.
Routine testing of stool specimens at laboratories will include
tests for the presence of enteric bacterial pathogens and might
also include an ova and parasite examination. However,
Cr. parvum, one of the most commonly reported waterborne
parasites, is not often included in standard ova and parasite
examinations and in certain instances, must be specifically
requested (31). During 1999–2000, tests for NLV and other
possible agents of viral origin were rarely performed or docu-
mented in the outbreaks that were reported to CDC. Collec-
tion of water-quality data depends primarily on local and state
statutory requirements, the availability of investigative per-
sonnel, and the technical capacity of the laboratories that test
the water. Furthermore, certain outbreaks can substantially
alter the relative proportion of cases of waterborne disease
attributed to a particular agent. The number of reported cases
is typically an approximate figure, and the method and accu-
racy of the approximation vary among outbreaks.
One key limitation of the data collected as part of the
WBDO surveillance system is that the information collected
pertains only to outbreaks of waterborne illness. The epide-
miologic trends and water-quality concerns observed in out-
breaks might not necessarily reflect or correspond with trends
associated with endemic waterborne illness. CDC and EPA
are collaborating on a series of epidemiologic studies to assess
the magnitude of nonoutbreak waterborne illness associated
with consumption of municipal drinking water and with
exposure to recreational marine and freshwaters.
Outbreaks Associated with Drinking
Water
The number of outbreaks reported during 1999 (15) and
2000 (24) is higher than the number reported during 1997
(7) and 1998 (10). As described previously, the number of
drinking water outbreaks had declined (2,3). The increase in
reported outbreaks should be carefully interpreted. Although
the number of drinking water outbreaks has changed, the
total number of persons affected by a drinking water out-
break during 1999–2000 (n = 2,027) is comparable to what
was initially reported in 1997–1998 (n = 2,038) and 1995–
1996 (n = 2,567) (2,3). Changes in surveillance and report-
ing of outbreaks might have improved detection of outbreaks
affecting limited, private systems that in turn, affect a rela-
tively limited number of persons. However, the increase in
outbreaks that affect persons in limited, private systems mer-
its further investigation by public health and water-quality
agencies.
Certain states reported drinking water outbreaks for the
first time in >10 years (e.g., Connecticut since 1976 or Utah
since 1986). California reported multiple drinking water out-
breaks after reporting no outbreaks in 1997 and 1998, and
compared with other years during 1990–2000, the number
of reported outbreaks in California increased slightly. The
number of outbreaks reported by Florida also increased.
Although the numbers of reported outbreaks increased over-
all, the seasonality of the drinking water outbreaks is consis-
tent with previous years, with the number peaking during the
summer months. The observed increase in the number of out-
breaks is associated with an increase in outbreaks associated
with consumption of untreated water from both surface and
groundwater sources, but specifically private wells.
The percentage of drinking water outbreaks associated with
surface water during 1999–2000 was 17.9% (i.e., seven out-
breaks) (Figure 2). This percentage is higher than the 11.8%
reported during 1997–1998 period (i.e., two outbreaks).
However, three of the seven surface water outbreaks reported
during 1999–2000 were associated with the direct ingestion
of surface water without any treatment or with inadequate
individual treatment. Two of these outbreaks were associated
with consumption of water during outdoor excursions where
point-of-use treatment (e.g., filtration or disinfection) might
have been attempted and was either inadequate to protect
health or was inconsistently or incorrectly applied. The third
outbreak occurred after a household had run out of potable
water and instead served untreated creek water to their guests.
These three outbreaks illustrate that the public might be
unaware that surface water, despite its clarity, is prone to
contamination by organisms. Surface waters should not be
Vol. 51 / SS-8 Surveillance Summaries 21
¶ Additional information is available at http://www.nsf.org.
** Additional information is available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/
gwr.html.
directly consumed without being treated at the point of use
or boiled. Manufacturers of point-of-use devices and the
National Sanitation Foundation (NSF) provide information
regarding different devices, instructions for use, and their
ability to make water safe for human consumption.¶ The
remaining four outbreaks comprise approximately 11% of all
drinking water outbreaks, an equivalent percentage to that
reported in 1997–1998. These four outbreaks were associ-
ated with systems that routinely received treatment. One out-
break of giardiasis occurred at a resort (Colorado, August 2000)
served by a noncommunity system. The increased demand
for water during the summer, coupled with multiple treat-
ment failures, resulted in the delivery of unfiltered and
nondisinfected water to the resort. These multiple failures
illustrate the importance of routine maintenance, specifically
among noncommunity systems, which do not have consis-
tent demand for water year-round. Two outbreaks (Florida,
March 1999 and August 1999) were associated with cross-
connections: one to an irrigation well and another to a toilet.
Another surface water outbreak (Ohio, August 2000) at a fair-
grounds was suspected to have resulted from back-siphonage
into the drinking water from an animal manure site. These
outbreaks indicate that even when treatment of water at the
source is adequate, deficiencies in the distribution system or
at the home can result in illness. Such deficiencies are pre-
ventable, and the public should be informed of how to detect
and avoid creating cross-connections.
Twenty-eight (71.8%) of the 39 outbreaks related to drink-
ing water were associated with groundwater sources. This
number is an 87% increase from the number reported in the
previous period (i.e., 15). Seventeen of the 28 outbreaks
(60.7%) were linked to consumption of untreated ground-
water; eight of 28 (28.6%) outbreaks were associated with
treatment deficiencies; and three (10.7%) were linked to
deficiencies in the distribution system. The observed pattern
of deficiencies is contrary to what was observed in the previ-
ous reporting period, where the majority of groundwater out-
breaks were associated with treatment or distribution system
problems. This pattern indicates that untreated groundwater
systems are increasingly associated with outbreaks of illness.
Groundwater systems, with the exception of systems influ-
enced by surface water, are not routinely required to use fil-
tration or treatment that would be expected to reduce the
number of pathogens in the water. EPA’s pending GWR** is
expected to establish multiple barriers in groundwater sys-
tems to protect against bacteria and viruses in drinking water
from groundwater sources and should establish a targeted
strategy to identify groundwater systems at high risk for fecal
contamination.
Twenty-six of these 28 groundwater outbreaks had a well as
the implicated water source, and two were linked to a spring.
The percentages of outbreaks associated with wells and springs
were similar during this reporting period to the 1997–1998
period. Although GWR is expected to have public health ben-
efits, these protections extend primarily to community ground-
water systems. Of the 26 well-related outbreaks that occurred
during the 1999–2000 period, only eight of 26 were associ-
ated with community wells. Ten were associated with indi-
vidual private wells, and eight were associated with
noncommunity wells. These systems would not necessarily
benefit from the promulgation of GWR, and therefore, the
quality of water in wells remains a public health concern.
Approximately 14–15 million households in the United States
rely on a private, household well for drinking water each year,
and >90,000 new wells are drilled throughout the United States
each year (32). In addition, contamination of a private well is
not only a health concern for the household served by the
well, but can impact households using other nearby water
supplies and could potentially contaminate the aquifer.††
Additional education efforts should be targeted towards well
owners, users, well drillers, and local and state drinking water
personnel to encourage practices that best ensure safe drink-
ing water for private well users.
Three outbreaks were associated with direct consumption
of water from irrigation systems, comprising approximately
8% of drinking water outbreaks (Figure 2). Cross-connections
to irrigation systems were implicated as contaminating fac-
tors in three other irrigation-related outbreaks. Irrigation
waters are not regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act,
because they are typically intended for agricultural purposes,
not for human consumption. Therefore, irrigation water would
not be expected to be treated to reduce the level of microor-
ganisms or other contaminants potentially in the water to the
same standards as water intended for consumption. In one
outbreak, children drank directly from an irrigation
canal while playing outside a home. In two other outbreaks,
water was directly consumed from an irrigation tap by sports
team members. In the first instance, the sports team consumed
water from a labeled irrigation tap despite being informed
that the water was not intended for consumption. In the
second instance, two teams drank from taps on the field
†† Although EPA does not regulate private wells and will not regulate them
as part of the proposed GWR, EPA lists recommendations for protecting
private water supplies at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/pwells1.html and
provides links to other sources of information.
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because no other source of potable water was available on
field.
The multistate outbreak of Sa. Bareilly, which was detected
through CDC’s Salmonella Outbreak Surveillance Algorithm
(SODA), epidemiologically implicated the consumption of
bottled water as a risk factor for illness. This is the first wide-
spread outbreak implicating bottled water in the United States.
Previous bottled water outbreaks occurred in New Jersey in
1973 (33), Pennsylvania in 1980 (34), and in the Northern
Mariana Islands in 1993 (4). Bottled water standards and regu-
lations, unlike the majority of drinking water standards, are
not set and enforced by EPA but by FDA. FDA regulates
bottled water as a packaged food product and bases their
bottled water standards on EPA’s tap water standards. In
addition, bottled water might be subject to state and volun-
tary industry regulation. Bottled water, before this outbreak,
had not been identified as a vehicle for transmission of infec-
tious organisms in the United States, although a bottled
water outbreak of Ca. jejuni associated with consumption of
water bottled in Greece was documented during the 1997–
1998 surveillance period (2). Because of the wide geographic
distribution of bottled water products, an outbreak associ-
ated with the consumption of bottled water would be diffi-
cult to recognize. FDA, EPA, CDC, and the bottled water
industry together should address concerns regarding consump-
tion of bottled water and public health.
Overall, the number of outbreaks associated with the five
drinking water deficiencies (untreated surface water, untreated
groundwater, treatment deficiency, distribution system defi-
ciency, and unknown/miscellaneous deficiency) increased in
each category from the 1997–1998 levels. The percentage of
outbreaks caused by a treatment deficiency and distribution
system problem decreased relative to reported increases in the
other three categories. Although problems with treatment and
with distribution systems remain critical concerns for safe
drinking water, the public’s lack of understanding of the risk
associated with consumption of untreated water and the
assumption that all water is suitable for consumption is a
concern also.
The relative proportion and number of outbreaks associ-
ated with different water systems also differs from the figures
from the 1997–1998 period (Figure 2). Outbreaks in com-
munity systems increased from 8 to 11 outbreaks (37.5%
increase); noncommunity outbreaks doubled from 5 to 11;
and individual system outbreaks quadrupled, increasing from
4 to 17 outbreaks. However, the proportion of outbreaks in
community systems decreased from 47.1% during 1997–1998
to 28.2% during 1999–2000, whereas the relative proportion
of outbreaks in individual systems increased from 23.5% dur-
ing 1997–1998 to 43.6 during 1999–2000. In addition, the
number of outbreaks reported that were associated with indi-
vidual systems during this period is the highest reported level
since 1984. The drinking water quality of community sys-
tems, which typically have been the focus of increased EPA
regulation, has continually improved. But noncommunity
systems and individual systems, which are not regulated to
the same extent, are continuing problems. The majority of
these individual system outbreaks are linked to currently
unregulated groundwater supplies, specifically private wells.
The populations served by these systems merit increased
attention by public health officials.
The etiologic agent was not identified in 17 (43.6%) of 39
outbreaks (Figure 2). These outbreaks of unknown etiology
comprised the largest group of outbreaks, followed by out-
breaks caused by bacteria (nine), parasites (seven), viruses
(four), and chemicals (two). During 1997–1998, parasites
accounted for the largest percentage of the 17 outbreaks (six
[35.3%]), followed by unidentified pathogens (five [29.4%]),
bacteria (four [23.5%]), chemicals (two [11.6%]), and viruses
(zero [0%]). The number of outbreaks per type of agent were
increased for all categories during 1999–2000, with the
exception of chemicals. Although the number of reported
viral outbreaks increased, indicating an improvement in the
availability and usage of laboratory detection methods dur-
ing previous years, viral outbreaks are probably substantially
underreported. Although viruses were suspected in other out-
breaks, specifically in those of unknown etiology, testing for
viruses was not performed. The technology for detection of
viruses in stool and water samples has improved, but testing
for viruses is not widely practiced. Investigators are encour-
aged to submit clinical specimens to CDC or state laborato-
ries that conduct these tests. Guidelines for collecting stool
specimens for identification of viral organisms are available
from CDC (35). Investigators are also encouraged to contact
CDC and EPA regarding testing of water samples.
Only two outbreaks of chemical origin were identified dur-
ing this surveillance period, the same number as was reported
during the 1997–1998 period. One outbreak related to a spill
of sodium hydroxide at a community water treatment plant
demonstrated the need for safe water treatment practices. The
other outbreak was a single case of methemoglobinemia in an
infant who required hospitalization after having been fed
boiled water taken from a private well. Coordination of pub-
lic health messages is critical; an intervention that was
intended to reduce the transmission of infections agents con-
centrated the chemicals present in the water. These figures, as
in the past, probably underrepresent the actual waterborne
chemical poisonings that occur. Multiple factors can explain
the low reporting rate, including the likelihood that 1) the
majority of waterborne chemical poisonings typically occur
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Because swimming is essentially a shared water activity or
communal bathing, rinsing of soiled bodies and overt fecal
accidents cause contamination of the water. Unintentional
ingestion of recreational water contaminated with pathogens
can then lead to gastrointestinal illness, even in nonoutbreak
settings (36,37). Fresh and marine waters are also subject to
other modes of contamination from point sources (i.e., sew-
age releases), watersheds (i.e., runoff from agriculture and resi-
dential areas), and floods.
Outbreaks involving gastroenteritis are more frequently
observed during the swimming season, which usually starts
on Memorial Day weekend (the last weekend in May) and
ends Labor Day weekend (the first weekend in September).
However, swimming also occurs year-round in indoor venues
and in states with more temperate climates. Outbreaks of ill-
ness by month (Figure 3) include two outbreaks that occurred
noticeably outside the summer months: one outbreak in a
Florida pool in March and another outbreak in an indoor
pool in Wisconsin in January.
As during the previous reporting period, Cr. parvum
accounted for the largest percentage of outbreaks involving
gastroenteritis (44.4%), followed by Es. coli O157:H7
(11.1%), NLV (8.3%), and Shigella (8.3%). An outbreak of
G. intestinalis was also reported in 1999. The last reported
recreational water outbreak of Giardia occurred in 1996. Out-
breaks of Ca. jejuni, Es. coli O121:H19, and a mixed Sh. sonnei/
Cr. parvum outbreak were also reported for the first time to
the surveillance system. Outbreaks of unknown etiology com-
prised 16.7% of the recreational water outbreaks involving
gastroenteritis.
in private residences and affect a relatively limited number of
persons; 2) exposures to chemicals through drinking water
might cause illness that is difficult to link to a chemical expo-
sure; 3) the mechanisms for reporting waterborne chemical
poisonings to the WBDO surveillance system are not as
established for chemicals as they are for WBDOs attributed
to infectious agents; and 4) health-care providers and those
affected might not as easily recognize chemical poisonings.
As a result of these factors, WBDOs of chemical poisonings
are less likely to be reported to public health officials.
Strengthening the capacity of local and state public health
epidemiologists and environmental health specialists to
detect and investigate outbreaks remains a priority at CDC
and EPA. As part of that effort, CDC and EPA should part-
ner with the states, CSTE, and the Association of Public
Health Laboratories to develop training materials and online
resources that would be useful and easily accessible to local
and state public health personnel. Although no federal regu-
lation exists for monitoring private wells, developing educa-
tional materials targeted towards the general public, informing
them of ways to maintain the safety and water quality of their
wells would be valuable. In addition, health messages regard-
ing the consumption of nonpotable water and appropriate
point-of-use treatment should be developed and distributed
to the public.
Outbreaks Associated with Recreational
Water
Of the 59 recreational WBDOs, those involving gastroen-
teritis were most frequently reported (n = 36). The 15
outbreaks reported in 1999 and 21
outbreaks reported in 2000 equal
or surpass the number reported in
1998, which previously was the
highest number of outbreaks
involving recreational water-related
gastroenteritis reported in one year
since the inception of the surveil-
lance system. Together, the out-
breaks involving gastroenteritis
reported during the 1999–2000
period are higher than the 18 out-
breaks documented in the previous
reporting period (Figures 7 and 8).
Since 1989, the number of gastro-
enteritis-related outbreaks has been
gradually increasing, and this
increase is statistically significant
(p = 0.01).
FIGURE 7. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with recreational water,
by year and illness — United States, 1989–2000 (n = 229)*
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* The total from previous reports has been corrected from n = 171 to n = 170.
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Twenty-two (61.1%) of the 36 outbreaks of gastroenteritis
occurred in treated systems (i.e., pools) that would usually be
expected to be chlorinated or disinfected to prevent transmis-
sion of infectious agents after unintentional ingestion.
However, the term treated system might pertain to systems not
routinely treated, including wading pools, interactive
fountains, and in one case, an untreated pool that was served
by a natural hot springs source. Multiple interrelated factors
can impede disinfection in treated venues, including an
increased bather load in a pool, high levels of organic mate-
rial (e.g., fecal material or environmental or skin debris) and
ultraviolet light, all of which deplete chlorine residuals that
usually maintain protection in the system. In certain outbreaks,
fecal material was indicated on the report as a contributing
factor to the outbreak; the majority of fecal accidents were
attributed to young children who were in or near the water at
the time the accident occurred.
Unlike previous years, a substantial number of different
bacterial and viral organisms were reported as causing gas-
trointestinal illness in these treated recreational water venues
(Figure 9). Nevertheless, >66% of these outbreaks were
attributed to Cr. parvum (Figure 4). Unlike other organisms,
which are more susceptible to the levels of chlorine typically
found in a pool, Cr. parvum is highly chlorine-resistant and
requires increased levels of chlorine and longer contact times
with chlorine for inactivation. Cr. parvum can survive for days
in public health-mandated chlorine concentrations required
for pools. In addition, its relatively limited size (4–6 µm) can
allow it to pass through particulate filtration systems during
recirculation of water in the pool.
Because a low number of oocysts
might cause illness in a person, even
ingestion of a limited amount of
water can cause infection.
Although the number of Cr.
parvum outbreaks has been steadily
increasing during 1990–2000,
multiple explanations could exist
for the increase. The properties of
the organism, coupled with the
popularity of swimming and the
tendency of persons to aggregate in
larger water venues, increases the
likelihood that swimming water
can become contaminated and that
swimmers will ingest the water and
become infected. However, the
increases in outbreaks could be
explained by a higher awareness of
Cr. parvum as a potential cause of
illness among swimmers by the public health community and
the recreational water industry and, as a result, are more likely
to be detected.
The majority of these Cr. parvum outbreak investigations
noted inadequate pool maintenance. Although low chlorine
levels are unlikely to have been the cause of the outbreaks, the
frequent reporting of low chlorine levels in these outbreaks
indicates a disturbing lack of awareness concerning the role
of chlorine and pH control as the major protective barrier
against infectious disease transmission in pools. Inadequate
disinfectant levels in any pool increases the risk for transmis-
sion of chlorine-sensitive pathogens (e.g., Es. coli O157:H7
or Shigella species) if an infected swimmer contaminates the
pool. Pool operators and staff should be appropriately trained
regarding the spread of recreational water illnesses and the
critical role of pool maintenance (i.e., disinfection, pH con-
trol, and filtration) in preventing WBDOs.§§
Fourteen outbreaks involving gastroenteritis after freshwa-
ter exposure were reported during 1999–2000, compared with
eight during 1997–1998. Es. coli O157:H7 accounted for the
most outbreaks of known etiology (three), followed by NLV
(two), Shigella species (two), Es. coli O121:H19 (one),
G. intestinalis (one), and Cr. parvum (one). Four outbreaks
were of unknown etiology. Certain outbreaks occurred in
beach areas that had substantial numbers of families bathing
and swimming in the water. Again, a common element noted
§§ Guidelines for pool operators and other information related to recreational
water illnesses is available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming.
FIGURE 8. Number of outbreaks involving gastroenteritis associated with recreational water,
by year and illness — United States, 1978–2000 (n = 146)
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¶¶ Additional information is available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/
beaches.
in these reports was the presence of diaper-aged children in
the water, diaper-changing on the beach, and even washing
off young children in the water. One incident involved per-
sons who swam in a lake that was had posted signs indicating
that the lake was unsafe for swimming.
Reports of infants and children swimming when they have
diarrhea is a problem common to both freshwater systems
and treated venues. Although health communication messages
have been targeted in the past for treated venues, similar
messages should be provided to those who swimming in fresh-
water venues. EPA, as part of the Beaches Action Plan, is
developing guidelines and information for users of freshwa-
ters.¶¶ Geothermal pools and hot springs should be examined
closely. In one outbreak, pools in a complex were exempt from
public health regulation because they were naturally occur-
ring hot springs and mineral waters. Hot springs, which fea-
ture high levels of minerals and elevated temperatures, are
potentially ideal venues for microbial growth or contamina-
tion. These springs and geothermal pools pose an increased
risk to swimmers, compared with treated pools because of
their lack of disinfection and filtration. Improved consumer
and staff education and supplementary treatment might be
necessary to prevent future outbreaks in these enclosed fresh-
water pools.
Twelve of the 15 outbreaks of dermatitis were associated
with hot tub or pool use. The majority of these reports of
dermatitis are associated with deficient maintenance and
inadequate disinfection of the
water. The higher temperatures
commonly found in hot tubs
deplete disinfectant levels at a more
rapid rate; hot tub operators should
be encouraged to actively check
and maintain adequate disinfectant
levels. In addition to rashes, reports
have been received of other symp-
toms. In Alaska, three of 29 per-
sons reported nausea. In the two
Maine outbreaks, persons also
reported headache, fatigue, and
other symptoms. The Colorado
outbreak was notable for its severe
symptomatology and an extended
duration of illness. Extended and
painful rashes associated with
P. aeruginosa outbreaks are unusual
but have been documented
(38,39). One report (39) also indicates that a substantial num-
ber of children are being affected by these outbreaks. In the
Colorado outbreak of P. aeruginosa, the persons affected were
primarily children, but no indication was provided that age
was a risk factor for infection. More remarkable is the
observed duration of illness. Certain persons reported chronic
illness (i.e., rash, joint pain, abdominal pain, and chest pain)
that lasted >6 weeks. Using remote pool monitoring services
in two of these outbreaks underscores the need for training
pool staff regarding the role of monitoring service and prompt
communication between service and pool operators when
problems are detected.
Three outbreaks of dermatitis that occurred after persons
swam in fresh or marine water were presumed to be caused by
an allergic reaction to the cercariae, the larval form of certain
nonhuman species of schistosomes. Cercarial dermatitis was
an identified problem in two of these lakes, and signs posted
by the health department regarding this problem were ignored
by swimmers. The extent of the problem of cercarial dermati-
tis caused by freshwater exposure is unknown, although it
probably occurs more frequently than what is reported to the
surveillance system. As schistosomes occur naturally in eco-
systems that bring snails and birds or aquatic mammals close
together, a substantial number of freshwater lakes in the United
States might cause illness among swimmers. Swimmers should
pay careful attention to where they swim, avoid shallow swim-
ming areas known to be appropriate snail habitats in lakes
associated with cercarial dermatitis, and report any incidents
to their local health department to prevent further illnesses.
FIGURE 9. Number of outbreaks involving gastroenteritis associated with recreational water,
by water type — United States, 1985–2000 (n = 135)
0
5
10
15
20
25
1985–1986 1987–1988 1989–1990 1991–1992 1993–1994 1995–1996 1997–1998 1999–2000
Fresh
Treated
Year
N
um
be
r o
f o
ut
br
ea
ks
26 MMWR November 22, 2002
The four deaths associated with primary amebic menin-
goencephalitis (PAM) reported during the 1999–2000
period were all linked to freshwater exposure. Typically, these
cases are associated with swimming in freshwater bodies in
the late summer months because N. fowleri, which has been
implicated in >90% of the cases reported to CDC, prolifer-
ate in warm, stagnant waters. Previous cases of PAM have
been reported from states with more temperate climates (e.g.,
California, Florida, and Texas) or from areas with hot springs.
The amoebas associated with PAM are believed to enter
through the nasal passage. Preventing forceful entry of water
up the nasal passages during jumping or diving by holding
one’s nose or wearing nose plugs could reduce the risk for
infection.
Swimming in waters contaminated by animal urine was
the likely explanation for an outbreak of leptospirosis among
persons participating in an adventure race in Guam. Leptospira
species can be found frequently in wild animal urine, and can
be contracted through inhalation of aerosolized water or
ingestion of water while swimming. Leptospirosis can also be
acquired through abrasions. In this instance, the exposure was
associated with immersion of persons’ heads in a body of water
while they swam and swallowed water. Although outdoor
swimming is not necessarily dangerous, swimmers should be
educated regarding the potential risks resulting from swim-
ming in areas that are not secured from wild animal use.
An increased level of bromine, which is used to disinfect
pools and hot tubs, caused certain cases of chemical keratitis.
Inadequate disinfection of a whirlpool resulted in an outbreak
of legionellosis among 20 persons who stayed at a motel. Safe
disinfection practices and appropriate pool maintenance pro-
tocols should be communicated to operators and managers
of facilities that treat recreational water.
Outbreaks Associated with Occupational
Exposures to Water
Two outbreaks that do not fit into the previous categories
were reported to CDC by Minnesota and Hawaii. Outbreaks
associated with exposure to aerosolized water have previously
occurred but have not been reported to the WBDO surveil-
lance system (40,41). These outbreaks are discussed in this
report to demonstrate that water exposures are not limited to
ingestion and contact (e.g., through swimming), and these
outbreaks are preventable. Using barrier masks to prevent
inhalation of aerosolized water or disinfection of water that is
not being used for drinking or swimming purposes could have
prevented the respiratory illnesses associated with these two
outbreaks.
Conclusion
Data collected as part of the national WBDO surveillance
system are used to describe the epidemiology of waterborne
diseases in the United States. Data regarding water systems
and deficiencies implicated in these outbreaks are used to
assess whether regulations for water treatment and monitor-
ing of water quality are adequate to protect the public’s health.
Identification of the etiologic agents responsible for these
outbreaks is also critical because new trends might necessitate
different interventions and changes in policies and resource
allotment.
Surveillance for waterborne agents and outbreaks occurs
primarily at the local and state level. Local and state public
health agencies need to detect and recognize WBDOs and
implement appropriate prevention and control measures.
Improved communication among local and state public health
departments, regulatory agencies, water utilities, and recre-
ational water facilities would aide the detection and control
of outbreaks. Routine reporting or sharing of water-quality
data with the health department is recommended. Other
means of improving surveillance at the local, state, and fed-
eral level could include the additional review and follow-up
of information gathered through other mechanisms (e.g.,
issuances of boil-water advisories or reports of illness associ-
ated with agents thought to be waterborne).
One repeated observation regarding outbreak data collected
as part of the WBDO system was that the timely collection of
clinical specimens and water samples for testing and com-
mencement of an environmental investigation would have
resulted in an improved ability to detect the outbreak’s etio-
logic agent and the source of water contamination. However,
the course of an investigation is influenced by the ability and
capacity of public health departments and laboratories to rec-
ognize and investigate potential outbreaks of illness. Even when
personnel are available to investigate a potential outbreak in a
timely manner, a common observation is that investigations
cannot always be completed thoroughly. WBDO outbreak
investigations typically require input from different disciplines,
including infectious disease epidemiology, environmental epi-
demiology, clinical medicine, sanitation, water engineering,
and microbiology. Either further cross-training of existing
personnel needs to be implemented or additional personnel
and resources need to be made available or linked to those
who typically investigate reports of WBDOs.
State health departments can request epidemiologic assis-
tance and laboratory testing from CDC to investigate
WBDOs. CDC and EPA can be consulted regarding engi-
neering and environmental aspects of drinking water and rec-
reational water treatment and regarding collection of
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large-volume water samples to identify pathogenic viruses and
parasites, which require special protocols for their recovery.
Requests for tests for viral organisms should be made to CDC’s
Viral Gastroenteritis Section, Respiratory and Enterovirus
Branch, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National
Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID), at 404-639-3577.
Requests for tests for parasites should be made to CDC’s
Division of Parasitic Diseases, NCID, at 770-488-7760.
Additional information is available from
• EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Hotline at 800-426-4791, on
the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/safewater, or by e-mail
at hotline-sdwa@epa.gov;
• CDC’s NCID website at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod;
• CDC’s Healthy Swimming website at http://ww.cdc.gov/
healthyswimming; includes recreational water health com-
munication materials for the general public and pool
maintenance staff (e.g., information regarding disinfec-
tion, guidelines on response to fecal accidents [42], fact
sheets concerning recreational water illnesses), and an
outbreak investigation toolkit that can be used by public
health professionals;
• CDC’s Voice and Fax Information System, 888-232-3228
(voice) or 888-232-3299 (fax). Choose cryptosporidiosis
in the disease category; and
• for reporting WBDOs, CDC’s Division of Parasitic Dis-
eases, NCID, at 770-488-7760 or by fax at 770-488-7761.
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Appendix A
Selected Case Descriptions of Outbreaks Associated with Drinking Water
State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
Parasites
January
1999
June
2000
July
2000
August
2000
September
2000
Florida
Minnesota
New
Mexico
Colorado
Florida
G. intestinalis
G. intestinalis
G. intestinalis
G. intestinalis
G. intestinalis
2
12
4
27
2
Persons became ill after drinking well water. Environmental
inspection revealed that pigs were maintained 15 feet from
the well. Fecal coliforms were not detected in the water
samples, but data indicated inadequate levels of chlorine.
Initial water testing confirmed the presence of fecal coliforms
in the drinking water where persons were working in a wild-
life refuge. Further investigation of the well revealed that a
drain line from the well pit had been connected to the sewer
line, allowing contamination of the water by raw sewage.
Persons drinking water provided by others during a rafting
trip became ill. The water was either incorrectly purified
river water or river water that was untreated before consumption.
A resort experienced multiple failures in the pumping mecha-
nism and filtration system during drinking water treatment
that resulted in untreated river water entering the drinking
water supply. The water supply included a mix of spring
water and conventionally treated river water that usually was
pumped into and held in a water storage tank. A failure in
the primary system was reported; the backup pump was used,
and multiple filtration cartridges were later determined to
be defective. Although water in the holding tank was usu-
ally chlorinated, because of the demands placed on the sys-
tem during the summer season, chlorine might not have had
adequate time to inactivate Giardia cysts. Giardia was iden-
tified in samples from 5 of the 27 affected persons and in
the finished water in the holding tank.
Persons became ill after drinking water contaminated from
a cross-connection between watering troughs for exotic ani-
mals and the drinking water system, which created an
opportunity for back-siphonage of the trough water.
Coliforms were present in the water, but fecal coliforms were
not detected in the water samples. Data indicated inadequate
levels of chlorine.
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State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
September
2000
December
2000
Bacteria
June
1999
August
1999
November
1999
New
Hampshire
Florida
Missouri
New York
Texas
G. intestinalis
Cryptosporidium
parvum
Salmonella
Typhimurium
Ca. jejuni and
Es. coli
O157:H7
Es. coli
O157:H7
5
5
124
781
22
Household members used a private well where the water-
filtration system had inadvertently been shut off during a
1-month period by construction workers. The water was not
otherwise treated (e.g., chlorination).
An outbreak occurred among persons who had consumed
water from a community system well. The well had a series
of breaks and repairs, including a break reported days before
initial reports of illness. Investigation revealed low levels of
chlorine (0.03 mg/L) in the tap water.
Persons consumed water from a community well that was
routinely disinfected by chlorine, but investigators reported
that chlorine had been inadequate at the time of the out-
break. Seventeen persons were hospitalized.
A fairground was served primarily by chlorinated water, but
certain vendors used water from an unchlorinated shallow
well to make beverages and ice. Epidemiologic data associ-
ated illness (including 71 hospitalizations and two deaths)
with consumption of water from that well. Drought condi-
tions had lowered the water table and heavy rains occurring
during the fair might have contributed to contamination of
the well by surface water. Dye tests revealed a cross-connection
between a dormitory septic system and a well on the fair-
grounds, but did not confirm the presence of a hydraulic
connection between a nearby manure storage site and the
implicated well. However, testing had occurred 2 months
after the outbreak and after Hurricane Floyd had passed
through the area, raising the water table. Therefore, the pos-
sibility of a previous connection during the time of the fair
could not be ruled out. Although stool sampling of ill per-
sons indicated the presence of both Es. coli O157:H7 and
Ca. jejuni, only Es. coli O157:H7 was identified in water samples.
A city well water supply was implicated because all 22 per-
sons received municipal water and had no other common
exposures. Water quality data indicated that the routinely
chlorinated water was inadequately chlorinated for weeks
during the beginning of the outbreak. Subsequent to the
outbreak, a new chlorination system was installed for the
water supply.
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April
2000
June
2000
July
2000
August
2000
August
2000
Idaho
Idaho
California
Utah
Ohio
Es. coli
O157:H7
Ca. jejuni
Es. coli
O157:H7
Ca. jejuni and
Es. coli
O157:H7
Es. coli
O157:H7
4
15
5
102
29
Children reportedly drank water from the canal in their back-
yard while playing. Water from the affected household and
from the canal located near the home was tested. Coliforms
were not present in the home’s tap water, but 100 fecal
coliforms/100 mL were present in the canal water. Agricul-
tural runoff might have contributed to contamination of
the canal water.
Contaminated groundwater was implicated in this outbreak
among persons attending a geology summer camp. The
source of water was a spring box, a device used to collect
water, that was incorrectly constructed, potentially allowing
contamination by surface water and agricultural runoff.
Water samples from the spring box were positive for total
coliforms but negative for fecal coliforms. Breaks in the line
running from the spring to the camp were noted. Water in
the campsite hose tested positive for both total and fecal coliforms.
Campers ingested filtered creek water both directly and in
food reconstituted with creek water. They reported defecat-
ing near the campsite, and they had defecated in the water
while swimming. In addition, deer droppings, a possible
source of Es. coli O157:H7, were found near the creek.
Although campers also reported swimming in the creek,
swimming could not be implicated as an exposure. Illness
was confirmed through laboratory tests.
Participants at a football camp drank from an irrigation sys-
tem tap that was not intended for human consumption. No
hospitalizations or deaths were reported. Ca. jejuni was the
most commonly isolated organism among submitted stool
specimens and was also isolated from water samples; Es. coli
O157:H7 and O111 were also isolated from stool speci-
mens, but shiga toxins for these organisms were not found
in water samples.
Persons who had attended a county fair were confirmed for
Es. coli O157:H7 by stool culture. Additional cases of
gastrointestinal illness were identified in the community;
however, either they could not be laboratory-confirmed as
Es. coli O157:H7 or they were probably secondary cases.
Nine of the 29 culture-confirmed persons were hospitalized.
Other potential risk factors (e.g., a particular food item,
beverage, or direct exposure to animals) could not be impli-
cated. However, consumption of food and beverages sold
within a particular area of the fairgrounds was a substantial
State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
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April–
August
2000
10 South-
eastern
states:
Alabama,
Arkansas,
Georgia,
Kentucky,
Louisiana,
Missouri,
North
Carolina,
Tennessee,
Virginia,
and West
Virginia
Salmonella
Bareilly
84
exposure. Investigation revealed that the branch of the dis-
tribution system supplying the vendors in the implicated
area also supplied an animal show barn. Spigots connecting
hoses to both the animal areas and the concession stands
were not equipped with backflow-prevention devices. There-
fore, possible back-siphonage might have resulted in con-
tamination of the water supply used for human consumption.
Although, water samples taken from the municipal system
supplying the fair and water taken after the closure of the
fair were negative for coliforms, one spigot serving the
implicated vendor area tested positive for coliforms, but nega-
tive for Es. coli.
The outbreak was detected by CDC’s Surveillance Outbreak
Detection Algorithm. Forty-three of the 84 persons were
enrolled in a case-control study with 76 matched controls.
The outbreak was associated with drinking bottled water
and water from private wells or springs. Twenty-five persons
drank water from private wells; Sa. Bareilly was recovered
from one patient’s well. The majority of source wells were
located in a limestone area in the southeastern United States;
wells drilled in limestone are subject to contamination from
different sources, including surface water. Among eight per-
sons who did not drink well or spring water in the week
before illness, the consumption of either of two brands of
water bottled by one company was epidemiologically impli-
cated as a risk factor for illness. A Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) traceback investigation of the two implicated
brands (spring water and “infant water,” water marketed spe-
cifically for consumption by infants) linked the bottled
water to one facility in the southeastern United States. An
investigation of the facilities determined that the two impli-
cated products had different sources, but water flowed
through the same lines before bottling. Infant water was
derived from a municipal source and passed through mul-
tiple treatment steps at the facility (separate from the spring
water), and then stored before the bottling process. The bot-
tling process included two filtration steps, ultraviolet irra-
diation and an nonautomated ozonization step. The bottled
spring water came from water transported from a spring in
north Georgia. After the spring water was fluoridated at the
plant, the spring water shared the same treatment and bot-
tling path as the infant water. Logs from daily in-house test-
ing did not indicate coliforms; however, raw spring water
samples tested by an independent laboratory in June were
positive for total coliforms. Environmental samples collected
State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
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Viruses
July
1999
June
2000
June
2000
New
Mexico
West
Virginia
Kansas
Small round-
structured virus
Norwalk-like
virus
Norwalk-like
virus
70
123
86
by CDC and FDA during the investigation did not yield Sa.
Bareilly, but one of the 105 samples taken from a lot of bottled
water produced in September was positive for Es. coli, and
two of 105 samples were positive for other coliforms. Treat-
ment provided should have been adequate to prevent con-
tamination of the bottled water, but finding coliforms implies
that interruption of treatment or suboptimal operation might
have allowed fecal contamination of the bottled water.
Inspection of the treatment process did not reveal any obvi-
ous deficiencies; therefore, the source of the contamination
remains unknown.
At a scout camp, a spring box influenced by surface water
was the key factor in the outbreak. Small round-structured
virus was observed in stool samples from three of 22 speci-
mens submitted. An association with consumption of water
or any drinks prepared with water was observed, although
the numbers were not statistically significant. No other food
items were associated with the outbreak. Assessment of the
drinking water system indicated that the spring box was situ-
ated at a lower elevation than the latrines and other build-
ings with individual septic systems. Water samples taken from
the well and distribution system were positive for fecal coliforms.
Multiple cohorts of camp attendees reported gastrointesti-
nal illness occurring during a multiweek period. Consump-
tion of food items and a history of swimming were ruled
out as vehicles of transmission. The epidemiologic informa-
tion could not statistically implicate water as the vehicle of
exposure; however, the environmental investigation deter-
mined that two wells that provided the drinking water were
located near a lagoon and one well was visibly contaminated
with sewage. Fecal coliforms were isolated from both wells.
Persons who attended two different parties at a reception
hall on 2 separate days became ill. The facility’s well water
was the only common source between the two groups, and
the water was not filtered or treated. Norwalk-like virus was
isolated from individual stool specimens from both groups.
Inspection of the well serving the facility indicated improper
well construction, and sampled water tested positive for
coliforms.
State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
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July
2000
Chemicals
April
1999
November
1999
January
1999
March
1999
March
1999
Norwalk-like
virus
Nitrate
Sodium
hydroxide
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
147
1
2
4
3
6
Untreated well water at a camp facility was implicated. Test-
ing identified fecal and total coliforms in one of the wells
and in the areas of the distribution system serving the recre-
ational vehicles and tent areas in the campground.
An infant was fed formula prepared with boiled tap water
from a private well for >2 days after the household ran out
of bottled water normally used to prepare infant formula.
The infant became ill, was hospitalized, and was treated to
reverse increased methemoglobin levels. Subsequent testing
of the tap water revealed the presence of fecal coliforms and
nitrate. Inorganic tests for metals were negative.
Lack of a check valve at a community well resulted in spill-
age of approximately 200 gallons of sodium hydroxide into
a 110,000-gallon well during a multihour period. Although
only two persons reported illness, a cohort estimated at 100–
1,000 persons might have been affected. The first person to
report an adverse effect suffered a first-degree burn from
showering in the contaminated water. The second person
suffered cramps, presumably from ingestion of the water.
A well was improperly constructed, and water was not rou-
tinely disinfected or filtered. Persons interviewed indicated
water had been turbid before the outbreak. Two water samples
indicated coliforms were present.
An outbreak occurred at an apartment building that usually
received municipal water from a well disinfected with chlo-
rine. The outbreak involved a cross-connection within the
apartment complex to an irrigation well. Total coliforms were
found in samples taken after the outbreak had occurred, but
fecal coliforms were not found. A stool specimen from
one of the affected persons tested negative for bacterial and
parasitic enteric pathogens.
Outbreak involved a cross-connection to an irrigation well
from a municipal surface water system. The municipal
water system was routinely treated and filtered. The irriga-
tion well in question was in unsatisfactory sanitary condi-
tion and was located 25 feet from a commercial septic system
and 10 feet from a garbage container. No clinical testing was
performed.
California
Wisconsin
New Jersey
Florida
Florida
Florida
Unidentified etiologic agents
State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
Vol. 51 / SS-8 Surveillance Summaries 35
May
1999
July
1999
July
1999
August
1999
April
2000
Florida
California
Washington
Washington
Florida
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
3
31
46
68
71
An outbreak occurred after persons in the household began
drinking well water. Well was located 10 feet from a chicken
coop. Duration of illness was approximately 60 days. No
clinical results were provided. Chlorine residuals were not
detected in water samples.
An outbreak occurred among persons who visited a camp
cabin. Diarrhea, vomiting, and cramps were reported.
Median incubation period was 24 hours, and median dura-
tion of illness was 24 days. The well used for drinking water
was not routinely disinfected or filtered. Water samples tested
positive for fecal coliforms.
Persons had consumed untreated creek water, but tests for
Cryptosporidium parvum, G. intestinalis, Shigella species,
Salmonella, Ca. jejuni, Es. coli O157:H7, and Yersinia
enterocolitica performed on stool specimens were all nega-
tive. One stool specimen was positive for Blastocystis hominis
and another for Endolimax nana. The median incubation
period before onset of illness among the 46 persons was 34
hours (range: 10–95.5 hours), and their median duration of
illness was 38 days (range: 2–192 days).
Participants of a soccer match reported gastrointestinal ill-
ness. The most commonly reported symptoms were diar-
rhea (72%), vomiting (78%), and nausea (84%). No one
food or beverage item was implicated, but drinking any bev-
erage prepared on site was a substantial risk for illness.
Although contaminants were not identified, the soccer match
took place at a polo field that reportedly had horse manure
at the site. Coliforms were found in the water tested, but
samples taken from the wellhead and the clubhouse were
negative for Es. coli. Stool specimens tested negative for
enteric bacteria and parasites.
Clinical testing was attempted when the outbreak occurred
among persons who drank water from untreated wells. A
sinkhole in a local lake had developed, allowing water to be
directed into the aquifer. Before the sinkhole was plugged,
water from 78 of the surrounding wells was tested. Nine-
teen of the wells were negative for coliforms; 33 were posi-
tive for total coliforms; and 26 were positive for fecal
coliforms. Cryptosporidium was found in one of the wells.
After the sinkhole was plugged, 58 wells were negative for
coliforms; 21 wells were positive for total coliforms; and none
State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
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June
2000
September
2000
Florida
California
Unknown
Unknown
2
63
was positive for fecal coliforms. No enteric pathogens were
identified in one clinical specimen that was submitted. No
viral testing of either clinical specimens or water samples
was reported.
An outbreak was associated with consumption of untreated
well water; two persons reported diarrhea that lasted approxi-
mately 60 days. The stool specimen collected from one per-
son tested negative for Giardia but positive for B. hominis.
The well was located in an area that had experienced flood-
ing and heavy rainfall before the outbreak. The affected per-
sons indicated that dark residue and air bubbles had appeared
in their water around the time of illness. Environmental
assessment confirmed that the well was in unsatisfactory sani-
tary condition and noted the presence of grit and air bubbles
in the water. Total coliforms were observed in water samples
taken after disinfection of the well, although fecal coliforms
were absent. The conclusion of the investigators was that
the well might have been contaminated by surface water.
An outbreak occurred after football players consumed water
after a game from an irrigation system coupler located on
the playing field. The water was not intended for human
consumption and was subject to contamination from back-
siphonage of surface water that collected around the sprin-
kler heads and control valves. Both total and fecal coliforms
>16,000 most probable number/100 mL were isolated from
the irrigation source water. No hospitalizations or deaths
resulted. Because the median incubation period was 12 hours
(range: 5–31 hours) and the median duration of illness
was also 12 hours (range: 1 hour–3 days), the outbreak was
probably of viral or bacterial origin.
State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
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Appendix B
Selected Case Descriptions of Outbreaks Associated with Recreational Water
State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
Parasites
July and
August
1999
July
1999
July
1999
June
2000
June
2000
Wisconsin
and Florida
Minnesota
Massachusetts
Ohio
Nebraska
Cryptosporidium
parvum
Cr. parvum
Giardia
intestinalis
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
10
18
700
225
Both outbreaks were linked to private swimming pools; chlo-
rine levels had not been tested in either of these outbreaks.
Chlorine levels were inadequate at a trailer park swimming
pool because the chlorinator needed repair.
The common exposure for persons affected was swimming
in a local pond. Giardiasis was laboratory-confirmed.
Although the source water was not tested for G. intestinalis,
water tests for the pond indicated high levels of total
coliforms.
A swimming pool at a private club was implicated. An
investigation determined that additional risk factors for
cryptosporidiosis (e.g., drinking municipal water, eating
unpasteurized food, or visiting a local zoo) were not statisti-
cally significant. However, the investigation did determine
that a substantial risk factor for illness was oral contact with
water. The pool consisted of a zero-entry–level pool (i.e., a
simulated beach entry) that was connected to both a baby
wading pool and adult pool with a water slide. Review of
pool records indicated that on >2 days, the chlorine residual
was inadequate, including on days when the bather load was
high and air temperature hot. In addition, multiple fecal
accidents had been reported. Testing of water samples at
CDC, using Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Method 1622, demonstrated the presence of Cr. parvum
oocysts in the water.*
Surveillance conducted by a county health department
revealed a cluster of laboratory-confirmed cases of
cryptosporidiosis, primarily among persons who were mem-
bers of two private clubs with swimming facilities (clubs A
and B). Case-control studies were conducted among mem-
bers of the two clubs. Swimming and being splashed with
pool water at club A was statistically associated with illness.
Club A had four pools: outdoor adult and baby pools and
10 and 6,
respectively
*CDC. Protracted outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis associated with swimming pool use—Ohio and Nebraska, 2000. MMWR 2000;50:406–10.
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State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
June
2000
July
2000
July
2000
July
2000
July
2000
July
2000
Georgia
Minnesota
Minnesota
Florida
South
Carolina
Minnesota
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
36
7
6
3
26
220
indoor adult and baby pools. The two outdoor pools shared
a filtration system, whereas the two indoor pools had sepa-
rate filtration systems but were connected by a pipe used to
equilibrate the water level of the pools. Fecal accidents had
occurred before the outbreak. Review of the pool mainte-
nance logs revealed a 2-day period when the baby pool had
not been chlorinated.†
Persons reported illness after attending a private pool party
where, in addition to swimming in a neighborhood pool,
party attendees also swam in an inflatable pool. Inadequate
chlorine levels were detected in the neighborhood pool. No
treatment was documented for the inflatable pool.
Inadequate chlorination and filtration were documented in
this outbreak among attendees at a day camp.
Information from interviews implicated a hotel pool in an
outbreak of cryptosporidiosis among members of a baseball
team. Both whirlpool and pool samples were negative for
Cr. parvum.
Inadequate water quality and low chlorine levels were docu-
mented in an outbreak at an apartment complex. Fecal
material had been visible in the pool at the apartment complex.
Water-quality data from a neighborhood pool implicated in
an outbreak of cryptosporidiosis were inconclusive. Coliform
tests were negative; however, these tests were conducted
after the outbreak had occurred and the pool had been treated
with high levels of chlorine. Chlorine levels at the time of
and after the outbreak were unreported. Certain factors might
have contributed to the outbreak, including a history of
symptomatic children swimming in the pool before the out-
break and increased rain activity that might have decreased
the water quality by diluting chlorine levels or facilitated
runoff into the pool.
An outbreak of cryptosporidiosis occurred at a public swim-
ming beach. A total of 220 persons reporting illness were
asked questions regarding swimming exposure and food con-
sumed while at the beach. Exposure to the water (i.e., get-
ting the head wet while swimming) was associated with
† CDC. Protracted outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis associated with swimming pool use—Ohio and Nebraska, 2000. MMWR 2000;50:406–10.
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State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
August
2000
August
2000
August
2000
August
2000
August
2000
Bacteria
August
1999
Colorado
Florida
Florida
Florida
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Es. coli
O157:H7
112
19
5
5
4
5
illness. The inspection conducted by the county health
department did not identify any plumbing deficiencies at
the beach clubhouse. Reports of construction on a sewer
line were investigated, but the investigators determined that
the source of contamination was persons washing babies in
the lake while changing diapers on the beach.
The epidemiologic investigation implicated swimming in
the main pool or having contact with the water as a risk
factor for illness among the persons who attended a private
party at a municipal pool. Although the main pool shared a
silica-sand filtration system with a smaller, adjacent wading
pool, contact with the wading pool was a substantial risk
factor.
Exposure to the pool at a resort was a substantial risk factor
for infection. In addition, infection was associated with
longer times of exposure to the resort pool water. Complaints
of cloudy water and diapered children swimming in the pool
were reported.
This outbreak was linked to the outbreak that occurred in
Ohio in June 2000. A family from Ohio who were members
of the implicated swim club vacationed in Florida. While in
a pool in Florida, the ill infant had two fecal accidents.
Illness was associated with swimming in a pool, and one
infected child reportedly swam while ill. Water quality
information was not available.
This outbreak was detected through routine surveillance. All
four were interviewed by the state health department and
queried about history of illness and exposures to water, food,
animals, and child care centers. All four persons reported
swimming in the same municipal swimming pool. No cor-
rective action was taken. The outbreak was reported after
the pool had closed at the end of the swimming season.
Swimmers who had visited the same beach became ill. The
popular beach featured a shallow, dammed area that was used
for wading. Total and fecal coliforms were detected in water
samples collected before and during the outbreak, although
the levels did not exceed regulatory levels for microbiologic
quality of water. One sample that was tested for Es. coli
O157:H7 was negative.
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State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
August
1999
May
2000
July
2000
July
2000
Washington
Wisconsin
Connecticut
Minnesota
Es. O157:H7
Legionella
pneumophila
Es. coli
O157:H7
Shigella sonnei
36
20
11
15
A freshwater outbreak occurred among visitors to a state park.
Swimming in the lake, getting lake water in the mouth, and
swallowing water from the lake were all associated with ill-
ness. In addition, Es. coli O157:H7 was laboratory-confirmed
among the affected persons, including seven hospitalizations,
and isolated from samples of sediment from the lake as well
as the water.
A whirlpool was implicated in a serologically confirmed
outbreak of Pontiac fever among 20 persons who visited a
hotel. L. pneumophila group 5 bacteria were isolated from
the whirlpool but not from the swimming pool. Additional
samples collected from sand filters, a water heater, and a
shower also were negative for L. pneumophila. Disinfectant
levels for both the whirlpool and pool were inadequate at
the time of the outbreak. Analysis of responses to question-
naires administered to motel visitors revealed that only whirl-
pool and swimming pool exposures were substantial risk
factors for illness. No other possible common exposures dem-
onstrated associations with illness. The investigation con-
cluded from both the epidemiologic and environmental data
that the whirlpool was the likely vehicle of transmission.
The outbreak occurred among persons who lived in or vis-
ited the same community during the last 2 weeks of July. An
environmental assessment of both well water and lake water
was conducted. The well water system was found to be in
compliance with drinking water standards, and samples from
two wells and ice made from this water were all negative for
total coliforms. Lake water sampled after the outbreak was
negative for Es. coli and shiga toxins but was positive for
total and fecal coliforms. No other environmental problem
at the lake was identified, and animal feces collected from
local wildlife tested negative for Es. coli O157 or any other
shiga toxin–producing isolates. The environmental assess-
ment, combined with epidemiologic evidence, implicated
swimming at the lake and swallowing water as substantial
risk factors for illness. During this same time period, a tod-
dler with severe diarrhea reportedly had swum in the water
during a 1-week period while ill.
Fifteen persons reported illness after swimming at a fresh-
water lake. Of these, 13 tested positive for Sh. sonnei, one
for Cr. parvum, and one for both organisms.
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State
where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
August
2000
Viruses
June
1999
June
1999
January
2000
Other
June
1999
June
1999
Minnesota
New York
Idaho
Wisconsin
Illinois
California
Sh. sonnei
Norwalk-like
virus
Norwalk-like
virus
Norwalk-like
virus
Unknown
Unknown
25
168
25
9
25
23
The only shared exposure among the affected persons was
swimming in a particular area of a public beach. Seventeen
persons from >5 families who separately attended the beach
on the same day became ill; these persons did not all attend
the beach together and did not consume the same food prod-
ucts at the beach. Eight other persons, who were identified
through routine surveillance, also reported swimming at the
beach on the date in question. Water samples collected
>2 days after the implicated day did not test positive for
Shigella organisms. Because of the substantial number of chil-
dren swimming at the lake, a fecal accident was the likely
source of contamination.
The outbreak was associated with swimming in shallow water
at a freshwater lake. Feces had been removed from the lake
that day by lifeguards.
The outbreak occurred at a resort and water park. The pool
implicated in the investigation was untreated. The source of
the pool’s water was a natural hot springs that was high in
mineral content and was not chlorinated or filtered. The
investigators noted that geothermal pools used for swim-
ming are not required to be regulated by public health offi-
cials in that locale. The same pool had been implicated in a
previous outbreak of Norwalk-like virus in June 1996.
A motel pool was linked to the outbreak. The affected per-
sons had attended a party where diapered infants were in the
water; they became ill in <48 hours after attending the event.
Stool specimens collected from these persons tested positive
for Norwalk-like virus by reverse-transcriptase polymerase
chain reaction and were negative for enteric bacteria.
Persons reported gastrointestinal illness after swimming in a
community lake. A septic system failure had occurred,
resulting in sewage contamination of the lake. Tests of the
lake water on >2 dates before and after the first case was
reported were all positive for fecal coliforms.
An outbreak of suspected viral etiology occurred among per-
sons who attended three separate pool parties at an apart-
ment complex. Initially, the outbreak was reported as a
possible foodborne outbreak, but no food items had been
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where Suspected Number
Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
date(s) occurred etiologic agent affected Case description
August
1999
September
1999
Florida
Texas
Sh. sonnei and
Cr. parvum
Unknown
38
12
shared among the persons who had attended the three par-
ties. Moreover, persons who only ate and did not swim in
the pool did not report illness. Stool specimens collected
from two persons tested negative for bacterial and parasitic
pathogens. No indication was provided that viral testing was
done. The health department conducted a physical inspec-
tion of the pool and examined pool maintenance records.
No water testing was performed by the health department,
nor were pool maintenance records available for the dates
immediately after the day of exposure, although reported
chlorine levels seemed adequate. However, swimmers
reported that on the day in question, the pool was over-
crowded and that toddlers were swimming in the pool.
The outbreak occurred among persons who visited a beach
park, and it was attributed to both Sh. sonnei and Cr. parvum.
Illness was epidemiologically linked to playing in an inter-
active fountain at the park, ingesting water, and consuming
food and beverages at the fountain. The fountain’s recircu-
lation and disinfection systems were not approved by the
health department and were inadequate or not completely
operational at the time of its use. Samples of the fountain
water tested positive for coliforms but did not test positive
for fecal coliforms. Nevertheless, the cause of the outbreak
was determined to be the fountain, which was closed until
the health department’s concerns could be remedied.§
Persons reported symptoms that included exhaustion, sore
muscles, headache, chills, and fever after attending a confer-
ence at a Texas guest ranch. One woman reported a miscar-
riage during her illness. Exposure to a hot tub, defined as
either immersion or being near the hot tub, was associated
with illness. Although clinical specimens (urine, blood, spu-
tum, and throat swabs) were tested for organisms, including
Leg. pneumophila serogroups 1 and 6, influenza virus, parain-
fluenza virus, and adenovirus, no infectious agent was iden-
tified. No testing for biologic or chemical agents was
performed on water samples because the hot tub had already
been drained, refilled, and hyperchlorinated before the
environmental investigation.
§CDC. Outbreak of gastroenteritis associated with an interactive water fountain at a beachside park—Florida, 1999. MMWR 2000;49:565–8.
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Outbreak outbreak or confirmed of persons
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February
2000
March
2000
May
2000
July
2000
July
2000
August
2000
Vermont
Maine
Florida
Maine
Florida
Florida
Bromine
P. aeruginosa
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
3
11
2
32
4
9
Chemical keratitis resulted from exposure to bromine in a
hotel swimming pool. Bromine levels were >5 ppm (accept-
able bromine levels are 1–3 ppm), and the pH level was >8.5.
Patrons that spent time with their heads underwater with
their eyes open were affected.
An outbreak of dermatitis affected persons who had stayed
at a hotel during a sports tournament. These persons
reported having a rash that was accompanied by other symp-
toms, including ear infection, cough, headache, and joint
pain. P. aeruginosa was isolated from water samples from
both the pool and hot tub. The investigator also indicated
that disinfection might have been hindered by a high number
of swimmers and the addition of water to the leaking pool.
Persons became ill after swimming in a lake that was not
licensed as a bathing area and had signs posted indicating
that the area was unsafe for swimming. No water testing
results were available before or after the incident. The lake
had been closed for swimming for years, and routine samples
had not been collected.
Swimming at a beach in a campground was epidemiologi-
cally implicated in an outbreak of gastrointestinal illness.
Affected persons reported a combination of symptoms,
including diarrhea, vomiting, nausea, cramps, and headache
that lasted 5–48 days. Only one stool specimen was col-
lected, which tested negative for bacterial pathogens; there-
fore, the outbreak was of suspected viral etiology. However,
no tests for parasitic organisms were reported. The environ-
mental assessment and interviews indicated that the pres-
ence of diapered children, a heavy bather load, and warm
water temperatures were contributing factors to the outbreak.
Water samples tested negative for coliforms.
Affected persons reported swimming in a freshwater spring
that had a history of inadequate water quality. Water samples
from the spring’s swimming areas were positive for total and
fecal coliforms on multiple dates. Drinking water at this
facility was also tested but was negative for coliforms.
A motel pool that was cloudy and dirty at the time of expo-
sure was implicated. Persons who swam in the pool and did
not share any other common exposure became ill with gas-
troenteritis. Disinfectant residuals and operation of the fil-
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October
2000
Alaska P. aeruginosa 29
tration system at the time of the investigation were deficient.
Problems had also occurred with the equipment used for
adjusting pH.
In an outbreak of dermatitis, the median number of persons
in the implicated hotel pool and hot tub was greater than
the maximal bather loads permitted. The maximum bather
load for the pool was nine persons, and for the hot tub, six
persons. On the basis of interviews, the median numbers of
persons were determined to be 12 (range: 4–20) in the pool
and 10 (range: 3–20) in the hot tub. The pool and hot tub
were on separate filtration systems. Sand from the pool
filter and water from the filter both tested positive for
P. aeruginosa. The filtration system was suspected as having
malfunctioned sometime during the day of exposure and
had been unable to maintain adequate levels of disinfection
to accommodate the excessive bather load.
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Glossary
Action level
Back-siphonage
Boil-water advisory
Cercarial dermatitis
Class
Coagulation
Coliforms
Community water
system
Contact time
Cross-connection
Cyst
Disinfection
by-products
Distribution system
Excystation
Fecal coliforms
Filter backwash
Filtration
A specified concentration of a contaminant in water. If this concentration is reached or
exceeded, certain actions (e.g., further treatment and monitoring) must be taken to comply with
a drinking water regulation.
A reversal of the normal flow of water or other liquid caused by a negative-pressure gradient
(e.g., within a water system).
A statement to the public advising that tap water must be boiled before drinking it.
Dermatitis caused by contact with the cercariae (larval stage) of certain species of schistosomes
whose normal hosts are birds and nonhuman mammals.
Waterborne-disease outbreaks are classified according to the strength of the epidemiologic and
water-quality data implicating water as the source of the outbreak (see Table 1).
The process of adding chemicals to water to destabilize charges on naturally occurring particles
to facilitate their subsequent aggregation and removal by flocculation or filtration.
All aerobic and facultative anaerobic, gram-negative, nonspore-forming, rod-shaped bacteria
that ferment lactose with gas formation within 48 hours at 95ºF (35ºC).
A public water system that serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or mobile
home park that has >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/year.
The length of time water is exposed to a disinfectant (e.g., chlorine contact time).
Any actual or potential connection between a drinking water supply and a possible source of
contamination or pollution (e.g., a wastewater line).
The infectious stage of Giardia intestinalis and certain other protozoan parasites that have pro-
tective walls that facilitate their survival in water and other environments.
Chemicals formed in water through reactions between organic matter and disinfectants.
Water pipes, storage reservoirs, tanks, and other means used to deliver drinking water to con-
sumers or store it before delivery.
The release of the internal (i.e., encysted) contents (e.g., trophozoites or sporozoites) from cysts
or oocysts.
Coliforms that grow and produce gas at 112.1ºF (44.5ºC) within 24 hours.
Water containing the material obtained by reversing the flow of water through a filter to dis-
lodge the particles that have been retained on it.
The process of removing suspended particles from water by passing it through one or more
permeable membranes or media of limited diameter (e.g., sand, anthracite, or diatomaceous
earth).
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Finished water
Flocculation
Free, residual chlorine
level
Groundwater system
Groundwater under
the direct influence
of surface water
Heterotrophic
microflora
Infant water
Individual (or private)
water system
Maximum-
contaminant level
Nephelometric
turbidity units
Noncommunity water
system
Nontransient
noncommunity
water systems
Oocyst
Public water system
Raw water
The water (e.g., drinking water) delivered to the distribution system after treatment, if any.
The water-treatment process after coagulation that uses gentle stirring to cause suspended par-
ticles to form larger, aggregated masses (floc). The aggregates are removed from the water by a
separation process (e.g., sedimentation, flotation, or filtration).
The concentration of chlorine in water that is not combined with other constituents, thus serv-
ing as an effective disinfectant.
A system that uses water extracted from the ground (i.e., a well or spring).
Any water beneath the surface of the ground with substantial occurrence of insects or other
macrooganisms, algae, or large-diameter pathogens (e.g., Giardia intestinalis or — for subpart H
systems serving >10,0000 persons only — Cryptosporidium parvum, or substantial and relatively
rapid shifts in water characteristics (e.g., turbidity, temperature, conductivity, or pH that closely
correlate to climatological or surface water conditions. Direct influence must be determined for
individual sources in accordance with criteria established by the state. The state determination of
direct influence might be based on site-specific measurements of water quality or documentation
of well construction characteristics and geology with field evaluation.
Microorganisms that use organic material for energy and growth.
Bottled waters that are marketed for direct consumption by infants or use in mixing with infant
formula.
A water system not owned or operated by a water utility and that serves <15 residences or farms
not having access to a public water system.
The maximum permissible concentration (i.e., level) of a contaminant in water supplied to any
user of a public water system.
The units in which the turbidity of a sample of water is measured when the degree to which light
is scattered is assessed with a nephelometric turbidimeter.
A public water system that 1) serves an institution, industry, camp, park, hotel, or business that
is used by the public for >60 days/year, 2) has >15 service connections or serves an average of >25
persons, and 3) is not a community water system.
Public water systems that serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months/year (e.g., a factory or
school).
The infectious stage of Cryptosporidium parvum and certain other coccidian parasites with a
protective wall that facilitates survival in water and other environments.
A system, classified as either a community water system or a noncommunity water system, that
provides piped water to the public for human consumption and is regulated under the Safe
Drinking Water Act.
Surface water or groundwater that has not been treated in any way.
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A filtration process that removes dissolved salts and metallic ions from water by forcing it through
a semipermeable membrane. This process is also highly effective in removing microbes from
water.
Untreated water (i.e., raw water) used to produce drinking water.
The water in lakes, rivers, reservoirs, and oceans.
Nonfecal and fecal coliforms that are detected by using a standard test. Total coliforms are a
group of closely related bacteria that are usually free-living in the environment, but are also
normally present in water contaminated with human and animal feces. With certain exceptions,
they do not cause disease. Specifically, coliforms are used as a screen for fecal contamination as
well as to determine the efficiency of treatment and the integrity of the water distribution sys-
tem. The presence of total coliforms in drinking water indicates that the system is either fecally
contaminated or vulnerable to fecal contamination.
Public water systems that regularly serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months/year (e.g.,
highway rest stations, restaurants, and parks with their own public water systems).
The quality (e.g., of water) of having suspended matter (e.g., clay, silt, or plankton) that results
in loss of clarity or transparency.
Surface water or groundwater that has not been treated in any way (also called raw water).
A microbial, chemical, or physical parameter that indicates the potential risk for infectious dis-
eases associated with using the water for drinking, bathing, or recreational purposes. The best
indicator is one whose density or concentration correlates best with health hazards associated
with a type of hazard or pollution.
A water provider that distributes drinking water to a community through a network of pipes.
An area from which water drains to a single point; in a natural basin, the area contributing flow
(i.e., water) to a place or point on a stream.
A program to protect a watershed from contamination or pollution.
Reverse osmosis
Source water
Surface water
Total coliforms
Transient
non-community
water systems
Turbidity
Untreated water
Water quality
indicator
Water utility
Watershed
Watershed-control
program
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